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Part One: Introduction to Albertine Satisfaction 
 Having some appreciation of the meaning of Christ’s 
crucifixion is an important part of Christian discipleship, and 
an important stage in the process of recognizing Christ for who 
He is and what He did.  After the crucifixion, according to 
Luke’s gospel, Jesus met His disciples on the road to Emmaus, 
although they did not recognize Him.  The disciples had been 
discussing the things that had happened in Jerusalem lately, but 
they could not make sense of them.  Jesus said to them  
“O foolish men, and slow of heart to believe all that 
the prophets have said.  Was it not necessary for the 
Christ to suffer these things and so to enter into His 
glory?”  And beginning with Moses and all the 
prophets, He explained to them the things in the 
scriptures about Himself (Luke 24:25-27).
1
   
 
As this passage demonstrates, Christians have been trying to 
fathom the meaning of Christ’s passion and death from the 
earliest days of the Church.  A conversation was begun at that 
time that has continued over the centuries, even to this day.   
 One way to appreciate that conversation about the meaning 
of the crucifixion would be to focus on the innovations, that 
is, on the introduction of new ideas into the conversation.  In 
that way, a distinguished place would be given to the work Cur 
Deus Homo (1098) by Anselm of Canterbury, because it contains a 
                                                     
1
 ὦ ἀνόητοι καὶ βραδεῖς τῇ καρδίᾳ τοῦ πιστεύειν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ἐλάλησαν οἱ προφῆται· οὐχὶ ταῦτα ἔδει παθεῖν τὸν 
χριστὸν καὶ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ; καὶ ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ Μωϋσέως καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν προφητῶν 
διερμήνευσεν αὐτοῖς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς γραφαῖς τὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ.  From www.nestle-aland.com 
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new theory, now called “satisfaction theory,” that explains 
Christ’s incarnation and death.   
 Another way to appreciate the conversation about Christ’s 
death would be to study something like a textbook, where all the 
popular ideas of the time are discussed.  The advantage of a 
textbook is that it brings many ideas together in summary 
fashion, giving pride of place to the best ideas while pointing 
out weaknesses.  The Sentences of Peter Lombard, written in 
approximately 1150, stood as the dominant textbook of the high 
middle ages.  But coming only fifty years after Cur Deus Homo, 
it ignores Anselm’s argument, focusing instead on explanations 
of the crucifixion from the patristic era, especially from 
Augustine of Hippo.  From Peter Lombard’s point of view, 
Anselmian satisfaction theory did not merit consideration. 
 By the time of Albert the Great, who lived from c. 1200 to 
1280, things had changed.  Satisfaction theory had become quite 
popular.  Thus, when Albert was writing his commentaries on The 
Sentences of Peter Lombard, early in his career, from 1243 to 
1249, he had a lot to say about satisfaction.  Later in his 
life, when he resumed theological writing, especially after 
1274,
2
 satisfaction theory remained centrally important to his 
understanding of the crucifixion.   
                                                     
2
 Especially in his Summa theologiae, Super missam, and De corpore domini. 
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 Albert, today, is not much associated with satisfaction 
theory.
3
  He left no single work dedicated to the topic, and what 
we can glean from his vast literary corpus is that he was more 
of a compiler than an innovator.  He is better known for his 
work in other fields, such as logic and the natural sciences.  
One way to respond to Albert’s lack of innovation with regard to 
satisfaction theory is to classify his ideas as forgettable, but 
before doing so, it may be observed that the fact that Albert’s 
views on satisfaction were not innovative or controversial 
testifies to their consistency and firmness, and therefore they 
are all the more valuable to the developing student.  A student 
should start by focusing on ideas that are widely held to be 
firm and consistent, before moving on to ideas that are 
innovative, experimental and tentative.  Once the student has 
grasped the best and most stable ideas, she will have a basis 
for considering various experiments and innovations.   
 That is why today’s student, trying to appreciate the 
conversation about the meaning of Christ’s crucifixion, would do 
well to approach the thought of Albert the Great.  In doing so, 
she would be imitating other students of Albert the Great, such 
as Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).  Albert’s ideas are non-
                                                     
3
 There is almost no literature in English on Albert’s view of satisfaction theory.  The magisterial 20
th
 Century two-
volume history of soteriology by J. Rivière, The Doctrine of the Atonement, makes no mention of Albert the Great.  
A smaller, one volume work from the same century, A Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement, by L.W. 
Grensted, covers Albert in two inaccurate sentences, which will be examined in part five. 
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controversial and yet highly influential, not only upon Aquinas, 
but upon much of medieval Christendom.   
 For Albert, the crucifixion is not the only part of Jesus’ 
life that had salvific impact.  Everything Jesus did on this 
earth was done for our salvation, beginning in the moments after 
his conception.
4
  Thus, to get a complete perspective on Albert’s 
soteriology, this paper would need to be expanded to cover 
Albert’s teaching on Jesus’ entire life and ministry, both in 
his divinity and humanity, and it would also need to cover 
Albert’s understanding of the Church and its activities to this 
day.  Albert sees the entire life of Jesus as soteriological, 
but this paper is focused on the crucifixion.   
 According to John McIntyre, there are thirteen different 
“models of soteriology,” among which satisfaction theory counts 
as number eleven.
5
  One could easily find elements of many of 
McIntyre’s models in Albert’s theology, but none would be as 
dominant as satisfaction theory.  In fact, for Albert, Christ’s 
crucifixion is almost synonymous with His satisfaction.
6
 
 Basically, according to Albert, satisfaction theory begins 
this way:  
                                                     
4
 “Dicendum quod circa illud sunt duae opiniones, quarum illa videtur mihi probabilior, quae concedit rationes 
inductas, et dicit quod Christus non meruit ab instanti conceptionis, sed post instans illud continuo meruit.”  Super 
Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.18, art.6, p.320a. 
5
 John McIntyre, The Shape of Soteriology, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992), 26-52. 
6
 “Unde vadens ad satisfactionem dicit, Matth. XXVI, 39 : Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu, scilicet vis.” De mysterio 
missae (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.1, cap.3, p.32a. 
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Although we can neither harm nor injure God, by 
sinning we subtract from the honor owed to Him.  We 
satisfy in order to restore the subtracted honor that 




To restore the honor that had been subtracted by the sin of 
pride, a just act of humility was needed
8
 that would correspond 
to the gravity of Adam’s offense.  But that gravity was 
infinite, since it was God’s infinite honor that was offended, 
therefore, an act of infinite humility was needed, but no mere 
man could achieve any such thing.     
Ambrose says, and Anselm proves in his book, Cur Deus 
Homo, that to satisfy for us a person must have both 
the capacity and the debt.  As  Lord God only-begotten 
Son of the Father, Christ had the capacity, and as 
man, he had the debt.  Thus, he had both the debt and 





Albert not only approves of the bulk of Anselm’s argument,10 but 
he sees it as consistent with patristic sources such as Ambrose.   
 Many recent theologians have not been as convinced by 
Anselm’s satisfaction theory as Albert was.  A typical modern 
objection to Anselm’s satisfaction theory is that it  
                                                     
7
 “Deum nec laedere nec damnificare possumus, peccando ei honorem debitum subtrahimus : et hoc fine 
satisfacimus, ut debitus ei honor, et prius subtractus restituatur.”  Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), 
Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.487b. 
8
 “Nos soluti sumus a decreto Patris obligante nos ad non intrandum paradisum, nisi tanta appareret in uno justitia 
humilitatis quae omnibus sufficeret.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.20, art.3, p.360a. 
9
 “Et hoc est unde pro nobis satisfacere debuit : dicit enim Ambrosius, et probat Anselmus in libro, Cur Deus homo, 
quod pro nobis satisfacere non potuit, nisi qui debuit, et qui potuit. Potuit autem in quantum Deus Dominus Filius 
Patris unigenitus : debuit autem in quantum homo fuit : debuit et potuit in quantum Deus humanatus, et in 
quantum homo deificatus. Hoc autem probavit Anselmus.” De mysterio missae (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.1, cap.3, 
p.30b. 
10
 The chief point of difference is that Albert denies Anselm’s claims that it was necessary for God to save us in the 
way that He did.   
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tends to suggest that God could only act within the 
framework of medieval notions of right order and right 
relationship.  Anselm’s approach, perhaps, does not 
allow God the sovereign freedom to shatter human 
expectations by an act of unthinkable mercy.
11
   
 
How vulnerable is Albert’s version of satisfaction theory to 
this criticism?  This paper will show in part five that Albert 
allows God greater “sovereign freedom” than Anselm.  According 
to Albert, God could have chosen to save us in some other way 
that we don’t now understand.  The way God did choose seems 
necessary to us, but it was not necessary for God.   
 Furthermore, this paper will show that the bulk of Albert’s 
notions of right order and right relationship are not particular 
to the medieval mind, but apply to human nature itself, whether 
of the medieval era or the modern era, or any other era.  To 
that end, this paper will show how “satisfaction” as a 
theological category is rooted both in non-theological 
experiences (part three) and in the Catholic sacramental system 
(part four).  To aid future researchers, this paper also will 
present, in appendix two, a transcription of an important 
manuscript of Albert’s writings on satisfaction.   
  
                                                     
11
 Denis Edwards, What are They Saying About Salvation?, (New York: Paulist Press, 1986), 16. 
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Part Two: Definitions of Satisfaction 
 Arriving at a workable definition of the term 
“satisfaction” poses a challenge.  Albert recognizes three 
definitions for the term.
12
  The first sense is the common sense 
(secundum substantiam).  Albert will often use the common sense 
to describe the process of becoming satisfied, that is, of 
having enough.  Thus, one may satisfy a hunger or a thirst or 
any desire.  One may also satisfy a question or a petition or a 
demand.  A plaintiff in a lawsuit will approach a court, present 
his plea, and ask for satisfaction.  The plaintiff will be 
satisfied when he receives just compensation for his loss.  This 
is the common sense of the term, which this paper will study 
more carefully in part three.   
 Theologians have added two technical senses of the term 
“satisfaction,” building them upon this common sense.  The 
Sentences of Peter Lombard more or less canonized a definition 
from the patristic era: “Satisfaction is a part of penance, as 
Augustine
13
 says, which cuts off the causes of sins, and does not 
even entertain their suggestions.”14  This is the definition of 
satisfaction as a part of the sacrament of penance.  It does not 
destroy the fomes or the tinder of sin, but weakens and quiets 
                                                     
12
 “Satisfactio tripliciter potest diffiniri.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.487b. 
13
 The quotation is actually from a work called De ecclesiaticis dogmatibus, c. 54, PL 58, 994, by Gennadius of 
Massilia (d. ca. 496).  This work was falsely attributed to Augustine for centuries.   
14
 “Est enim satisfactio poenitentiae, ut ait Augustinus, peccatorum causas excidere, nec suggestionibus eorum 
aditum indulgere.”  Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.487a. 
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it.  This paper will study it more carefully in part four.  
Finally, the fifth part of this paper will consider the third 
definition, the soteriological one, which comes from Anselm, who 
put it this way: “Thus, everyone who sins owes it to God to pay 
him for the honor he stole away, and this is satisfaction.”15   
 Albert is aware that there are some problems with these 
three definitions.  For example, Lombard’s sacramental 
definition pertains to the causes of sins, but is it not better 
to think of sin as something that lacks a cause, just as evil is 
not a positive reality, but is rather the lack of a due good?  
Albert explains by specifying that the types of cause that sin 
lacks are the efficient and formal causes.
16
  A hot thing warms a 
cool thing by giving it warmth.  The hot thing is an efficient 
cause because it imparts some essential form to the thing being 
warmed.  But a privation, by definition is the absence of an 
essential form, so no form is imparted by privation; rather, the 
form is removed by privation.  Blindness, for example, which is 
the privation of sight, does not have a positive essence.  
Therefore, blindness, as the lack of a form, does not have an 
efficient cause.  Thus, evil, insofar as it is evil, does not 
have an efficient or a formal cause, and neither does sin, 
insofar as it is sin.   
                                                     
15
 “Sic ergo debet omnis, qui peccat, honorem, quem rapuit Deo, solvere, et haec est satisfactio.” Anselm, Cur Deus 
Homo. 1.11. 
16
 Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.488a. 
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 In response, Albert explains that there is a sense in which 
a sinful act can be said to have three deficient causes.
17
  The 
desire (libido) may be stimulated, or there may be remnants of 
past sins, or there may be circumstances that encourage sin.  
These causes do not coerce sin, because coercion would remove 
free will, but they do function as deficient causes; and 
satisfaction, in Lombard’s sacramental sense, tries to cut off 
these causes.   
 It may be objected that Albert’s explanation has only made 
things worse, since his explanation suggests that we have the 
power to turn away from evil, when, in reality, conversion from 
evil is something that only God can do.  Recall the traditional 
Church teaching against the heresy of Pelagianism.  So, if we 
are the ones who make satisfaction, and if satisfaction cuts off 
the causes of our sins, then it seems that we are responsible 
for converting ourselves from evil.  Albert replies by affirming 
that only God can convert the human will away from sin, thereby 
defending himself from the charge of Pelagianism.
 18
  But he 
notes that even after such conversion, those three deficient 
causes may remain, in which case, we may labor to remove them. 
 Another problem with the Lombard’s definition is that it is 
not immediately clear what it has to do with the common 







definition of the term “satisfaction.”  The satisfaction that is 
part of the sacrament of penance (Lombard’s sense) consists in 
prayer, fasting and almsgiving.
19
  What does that have to do with 
satisfying a plaintiff’s request for justice following some 
loss?  Albert answers by explaining that sacramental 
satisfaction has medicinal value, because it tends to the 
restoration of the sinner.  The work of the satisfaction should 
be prayer for someone who sinned by pride, fasting for someone 
who sinned by lewdness, and almsgiving for someone who sinned by 
greed.  In this medicinal sense, satisfaction is a part of 
justice, because the work of the satisfaction must befit the 
sin, just as a medicine must befit the illness.
20
  Therefore, the 
sacramental sense does pertain to restorative justice, and 
therefore it is properly related to the common sense.   
 Albert also considers problems with the soteriological 
sense, the one most associated with Anselm.  Albert sums up 
Anselm’s definition while making slight modifications.  Albert 
defines satisfaction  
in relation to the end: although we can neither harm 
nor injure God, by sinning we subtract from the honor 
owed to Him.  We satisfy to this end: to restore the 
subtracted honor that is owed to Him: and this is how 
it is defined by Anselm.
21
  
                                                     
19
 “...satisfactio operis, quae fit per tria, scilicet orationem, jejunium, et eleemosynam.”  Super Marcum in cap.4, 
v.26-29, p.435b. 
20
 Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.488b. 
21
 “Tertio diffinitur in compartione ad finem: cum enim Deum nec laedere nec damnificare possumus, peccando ei 
honorem debitum subtrahimus : et hoc fine satisfacimus, ut debitus ei honor, et prius subtractus restituatur: et sic 




One problem is that the bestowal of honor, according to 
Aristotle,
22
 pertains to magnanimity, therefore Anselm and those 
after him should be discussing not satisfaction but magnanimity.  
Albert points out, in reply, that magnanimity deals with the 
bestowal of honor simply, but satisfaction pertains to the just 
restitution of honor that was taken away by sin.
23
 
 The following three parts of this thesis will examine the 
three senses of the term “satisfaction” more closely.  They are 
the common sense, the sacramental sense, and the soteriological 
sense.   
  
                                                     
22
 Cf. Nichomachean Ethics, Book IV.   
23
 Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.489a. 
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Part Three: The Common Sense of Satisfaction 
 
 Albert does use the terms “satisfy” and “satisfaction” in 
their common, non-theological sense, which is a usage that 
reaches far back into the classical era.
24
  Thus, he says that 
one may satisfy a thirst,
25
 and that the breathing in of air may 
satisfy the heart and the chest.
26





 being satisfied.  He includes more 
abstract desires, such as a curiosity
29
 or a question
30
 or an 
objection.
31
  In classical Latin, “satisfaction” had also 
acquired a legal sense, such that the Romans would speak of a 
perpetrator making satisfaction by suffering a penalty.
32
  
Albert, likewise, speaks of plaintiffs petitioning for 
satisfaction
33
 and of civil judges having the authority to impose 
satisfaction
34
 and he notes that a defendant may or may not be 
                                                     
24
 Cf. Plautus Pseudolus  5, 1, 28.  Cf. Cicero Tusculan Disputations 2, 17, 41. 
25
 “...tantum bibunt et ut futurae et praeteritae siti satisfaciant” De animalibus (ed. Stadler, 1916-1920), Lib.XXII, 
tract.2, cap.1, p.1361.  
26
 “...si submersione vel aliquo modo contingat impediri in attractu exterioris spiritus : tunc enim de illo quamdiu 
potest, satisfacit cordi et pectori.” De spiritu et respiratione (ed. Borgnet, 1890), Lib.II, tract.2, cap.1, p.247a. 
27
 “et cum multae sint indigentiae, varias oportet artes reperiri, ita quod homo solus secundum seipsum non 
sufficit satisfacere omnibus indigentiis suis.”  Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.I, tract.3, cap.2, p.33a. 
28
 “Et hoc est: ‘Quis mihi tribuat,’ desiderio sc. meo satisfaciens.” In Job 19:23 p. 234a. 
29
 “In hoc sexto libro vegetabilium nostrorum magis satisfacimus curiositati studentium quam philosophiae.” De 
vegetabilibus (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 1867), Lib.VI, tract.1, cap.1, p.339. 
30
 “Ut tamen etiam quaestioni inductae satisfaciamus...” Analytica priora (ed. Borgnet, 1890), Lib.I, tract.3, cap.2, 
p.520b. 
31
 “Inferius quidem subtiliter huic satisfaciemus objectioni.” Super Porphyrium De V universalibus (ed. Borgnet, 
1890), tract.4, cap.3, p.64b. 
32
 Cf. Martial, Epigrams, 12.14.3. 
33
 “Hic quidem, scilicet litigans, qui petit satisfactionem sibi fieri de injuria, viginti minas.” Politica (ed. Borgnet, 
1891), Lib.II, cap.6, p.152b.   
34
 “Et est simile sicut si aliquis gratia judicis vel senatus absolvitur a judicio mortis, et commutatur ei in judicium 




willing to make satisfaction.
35
  What is key in the legal sense 
is that satisfaction is an action done for the sake of undoing 
some previous harm.
36
  To give a 21
st
 Century example: if the harm 
done is the loss of one’s watch to a thief, then satisfaction 
entails the return of the watch by the thief to the offended 
party.  This is what Albert means by the dictum “restitution is 
the foundation of satisfaction.”37  To undo the harm, what was 
lost must be restored.   
 But satisfaction includes more than the mere restoration of 
what was lost.  Albert says that restitution is the foundation 
of satisfaction, but he does not say that restitution and 
satisfaction are equivalent.  In fact, he distinguishes 
carefully between restitution and satisfaction:   
Regarding the other point it must be said that someone 
being reconciled to his neighbor does so in two ways.  
Insofar as he has incurred an obligation because of 
the harm done, restitution will reconcile him (not 
repentance).  And, insofar as his neighbor was 
disedified by his bad example, satisfaction with good 




                                                     
35
 “Si rex terrenus alicui committeret vices suas in judicio rerum, daret ei plenariam potestatem absolvendi 
volentes satisfacere, et ligandi et condemnandi eos qui impoenitentes permanent.” Super Sententiarum (ed. 
Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.18, art.7, p.774b.   
36
 “Ad aliud dicendum, quod ... eadem virtus specie, diversimode moveat secundum diversum statum hominis 
quem movet, ut justitia aliter movet laedentem ad satisfaciendum,  et aliter in communi quemlibet ad opera 
justitiae.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.16, art.44, p.635b. 
37
 “Restitutio est fundamentum satisfactionis.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.45, 
p.535a. 
38
 “Ad aliud dicendum, quod restituens dupliciter reconciliatur proximo, scilicet in quantum tenetur ei de damno 
illato : et hoc modo reconciliat restitutio, non poenitentia proprie : vel in quantum deaedificatus est proximus per 
malum exemplum : et sic satisfactio bonis operibus reconciliat.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, 
dist.15, art.45, p.535b. 
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Thus, when a thief steals a watch, the restitution of the loss 
and the satisfaction for the crime are two different things.  If 
the theft was from a high-end watchmaker, and the police catch 
the thief, then justice demands not only that the stolen watch 
be returned to the watchmaker, but also that some additional 
penalty be imposed upon the thief, such as a fine or some jail 
time.  Thus, restitution and satisfaction are two components 
demanded by justice as the result of some harm being done, and 
both components have a penal character.   
 Whether we consider the juridical sphere or the sphere of 
friendship, satisfaction functions similarly.  If Jack steals a 
watch from his friend Jill, there are two problems: one is that 
Jill does not have her watch, and the other is that Jack and 
Jill’s friendship has been damaged, because Jack’s will is at 
odds with Jill’s.  If Jack returns the watch to Jill, 
restitution of the lost property will be complete, but their 
friendship will remain in a precarious state until Jack can make 
some satisfaction.  He must do something extra, as Albert says, 
to undo Jill’s disedification.  In contemporary language, we 
could say that Jack needs to do something extra to restore 
Jill’s confidence.  Satisfaction in this case might be something 
like baking Jill a cake or saying “I’m sorry” or giving her a 
gift.  In this case, Jill could accept Jack’s restitution and 
satisfaction without the intervention of any police, lawyers, or 
Nichols 16 
 
judges, and then satisfaction does not have any penal or 
juridical connotations. 
 Albert also considers the possibility of satisfaction when 
restitution is impossible.  
When someone hinders someone else from receiving 
something, he may do so justly, because he knows him 
to be unworthy of such an honor or such a thing, and 
in that case, he is not obligated to make 
satisfaction.  He may also hinder him unjustly, and 
then I say that he is obligated to make satisfaction, 
but not restitution, because he never actually had the 
thing.  Satisfaction in this latter case should be 
made according to the ability of the one satisfying 




Thus, satisfaction is possible, even when restitution is 
impossible, as long as the offending party has the willingness 
to make satisfaction, and this applies equally to courtroom 
disputants and to friends.  For example, imagine that the thief 
lost the watch after he stole it.  If the thief is poor, he may 
not have the means of making restitution, but he can still make 
satisfaction.  In the judicial sphere, he would suffer a fine or 
do some jail time.  In the sphere of friendship, Jack could do 
something special for Jill to try to make up for his offense.  
In the latter case, the friendship could still be restored, and 
in the former case, justice could still be done, even without 
                                                     
39
 “Ad aliud dicendum, quod ille qui impedit alium: aut juste impedit, scilicet quia scit eum indignum tali honore vel 
tali re, et tunc non tenetur: aut injuste, et tunc dico, quod tenetur satisfacere, sed non tamen reddere, quia ille 
rem illam adhuc adeptus non erat : haec autem satisfactio debet fieri secundum possibilitatem satisfacientis, et 
arbitrium bonorum virorum.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.43, p.532b. 
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restitution.  “Restitution is not an essential part of 
satisfaction, but it is required in advance as a foundation.”40 
 The third part of this thesis has shown how satisfaction is 
a concept that is rooted in several non-theological categories.  
Even the juridical use of the term is derived from truths about 
human needs and relationships that are by no means confined to 
the medieval era.  The following parts will show how Albert 
employs the term “satisfaction” in theological contexts, such as 
the sacrament of penance, and the atonement of Christ. 
  
                                                     
40
 “Restitutio non est pars essentialis satisfactionis, sed praeexigitur per modum fundamenti.”  Super Sententiarum 
(ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.10, p.485a. 
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Part Four: The Sacramental Sense 
 Satisfaction, in the sacramental sense, is something 
imposed by the confessor upon the penitent.  Referring to this 
sacrament, Albert says that “these are the words which the 
priest says when, by binding to satisfaction, he gives 
absolution.”41  Absolution and satisfaction go together.  The 
priest may impose a satisfaction (what today would be called a 
“penance”) consisting of some combination of prayer, fasting and 
almsgiving.
42
  The priest is able to bind satisfaction upon 
penitents and absolve them from their sins by using the power of 
the keys that Christ gave to the Church for binding and 
loosening,
43
 as stated in Matthew 16:19.
44
  The purpose of 
satisfaction is to please God,
45
 by undoing the harm of sin and 
recovering humanity’s pristine state,46 thereby becoming free.47  
Satisfaction obtains this freedom by building up the particular 
                                                     
41
 “Haec sunt verba quae dicit sacerdos, quando ligando ad satisfactionem absolvit.” Super Sententiarum (ed. 
Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.1, art.14, p.28b. 
42
 “Satisfactio operis, quae fit per tria, scilicet orationem, jejunium, et eleemosynam.” Super Marcum (ed. Borgnet, 
1894), in cap.4, v.26-29, p.435b. 
43
 Cf. Super Marcum (ed. Borgnet, 1894), in cap.9, v.27-29, p.558b. 
44
 “Et tibi dabo claves regni caelorum. Et quodcumque ligaveris super terram, erit ligatum et in caelis: et 
quodcumque solveris super terram, erit solutum et in caelis.” “δώσω σοι τὰς κλεῖδας τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν, 
καὶ ὃ ἐὰν δήσῃς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔσται δεδεμένον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, καὶ ὃ ἐὰν λύσῃς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔσται λελυμένον ἐν 
τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.” 
45
 “Per receptionem satisfactionis Deum placarent.” Super Marcum (ed. Borgnet, 1894), in cap.5, v.14-17, p.449b. 
46
 “Dicendum ad hoc, quod poenitentia in partibus suis habet restituere in pristinum statum, scilicet in contritione, 
confessione, et satisfactione : et praecipue quoad illam partem, quae est satisfactio.” Super Sententiarum (ed. 
Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.14, art.33, p.466a. 
47
 “Praedestinatio non est proprie nisi gratiae, et gloriae, et alia sunt indirecte operantia ad liberationem, sicut 
satisfaciendo.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.I, dist.40, art.3, p.309a. 
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virtue opposed to the given vice,
48
 so that even the root of sin 
is destroyed.
49
  It is the task of the priest, then, when 
imposing satisfaction, to select a fitting combination of 
prayer, fasting and almsgiving.   
There remain three things in satisfaction, namely, 
fasting which heals diseases of the body, and prayer 
which heals diseases of the mind, and the giving of 
alms which heals the diseases of ownership, whether 





Satisfaction is a matter of strict justice,
51
 and therefore it 
does have a penal character,
52
 which makes it laborious to some 
degree.
53
   
 The term “satisfaction,” when used in a sacramental sense, 
refers to only one of the three parts of the sacrament of 
penance.  In explaining this, Albert affirms the unity of the 
sacrament of penance, which “is one by the unity of the 
                                                     
48
 “Contrariae consuetudinis inductio per opera satisfactionis.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, 
dist.16, art.12, p.567b. 
49
 “Dicendum quod duplex est radix peccati, scilicet contracta et facta, secundum quod ex operibus relinquuntur 
similes dispositiones et habitus, ut dicit Philosophus. Prima autem radix debilitatur et exsiccatur, non poenitentia, 
sed contrario usu benefaciendi : et secunda est quae per poenitentiae satisfactionem eruitur.” Super Sententiarum 
(ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.16, art.54, p.652b. 
50
 “Tres autem residuae sunt in satisfactione, scilicet, jejunium quod sanat pestes corporis, et oratio quae sanat 
pestes mentis, et eleemosyna vel cordis, vel operis, vel utriusque, quae sanat pestes facultatis.” Super Iohannem 
(ed. Borgnet, 1899), in cap.4, v.51-53, p.193a. 
51
 “In satisfactione peccati, districta severitas justitiae cibat poenitentes.” Super Marcum (ed. Borgnet, 1894), in 
cap.6, v.41, p.483a.  “Poenitentia autem [est sacramentum] justitiae, propter satisfactionem.” Super Sententiarum 
(ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.2, art.1, p.43b. 
52
 “Si autem accipitur poenitentia ut sacramentum, tunc nihil prohibet passionem esse aliquid de essentia 
contritionis : quia poenitentia ordinatur contra peccatum, per poenam satisfaciens de peccato.” Super 
Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.16, art.6, p.550b. 
53
 “Significat satisfactionis laborem.” De mysterio missae (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.3, cap.17, p.137b. “In 
satisfactionis labore.” De mysterio missae (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.3, cap.20, p.153b. 
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sacramental form.”54  The feeling of remorse for the sin is the 
matter for the sacrament,
55
 and the form is God’s grace insofar 
as it informs that remorse.
56
  God’s grace informs the remorse by 
deleting the sin, and this is done through the three parts of 
the sacrament, namely, contrition, confession and satisfaction.
57
  
It is not enough to say that the words of absolution by the 
minister are the form of the sacrament, because it is not the 
words that sanctify the penitent, but rather God’s grace insofar 
as it informs the feelings of remorse.   
 Albert considers the objection that the form of contrition 
is different from the form of confession, and that both are 
different from the form of satisfaction.  This might seem to 
undermine the unity the sacrament of penance, given the 
metaphysical doctrine of the unicity of substantial form.  
Albert replies by affirming the individual forms of contrition, 
confession and satisfaction, but he maintains that the unity of 
the sacrament is preserved, because contrition, confession and 
satisfaction are related to the sacrament of penance just like 
parts are related to a whole.  Thus, a hand may have one form, 
and the foot another, and the intellect, too, and the will, but 
                                                     
54
 “Est unum unitate formae sacramentalis.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.16, art.1, 
p.540a. 
55
 “Dico dolorem esse materiam.” Ibid. p. 540b. 
56
 “Unde forma ipsius est informatio gratiae, vel grati informans hunc dolorem, in quantum sic informans.” Ibid. 
57
 This tripartite division of the sacrament of penance comes form The Sentences of Peter Lombard, Book IV, 
distinction 16.  Albert reaffirms this division all throughout his opera.  Cf. Super Marcum (ed. Borgnet, 1894), in 
cap.1, v.5, p.351a  Cf. Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.17, art.1, p.660a. 
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 Albert correlates the three parts of the sacrament of 
penance to three punishments.  “In contrition there is the 
forgiveness of guilt and release from eternal punishment.  In 
confession there is release from the punishment of purgatory, 
and in satisfaction, there is release from temporal 
punishment.”59  Thus, satisfaction pertains to some impending, 
external punishments, but that is not all.  
 Albert correlates the three parts of the sacrament of 
penance to three pangs of remorse that are suffered in the wake 
of sin.  “There is a threefold guilt,” Albert says.   
One pertains to the fault, which is a debt of eternal 
punishment, and when that is removed, the guilt still 
remains from the debt of purgation which is beyond the 
abilities of the penitent, and when that is removed, 
there still remains the guilt of a debt an expiatory 
punishment adjudicated according to the manner of the 




Contrition deletes the first pang of remorse, confession deletes 
the second, and satisfaction deletes the third.  Here Albert is 
talking about guilt, which is something that exists inside the 
person, and not in some external celestial balancing system.  
                                                     
58
 Ibid. p. 541. 
59
 “In contritione est dimissio culpae et poenae aeternae, et in confessione dimissio poenae in purgatorio, et in 
satisfactione dimissio poenae temporalis.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.22, art.6, p.894b.   
60
 “Reatus autem consequens triplex est: unus enim est conjunctus culpae, qui est debitum poenae aeternae: et 
illo soluto manet adhuc reatus et debitum poenae purgatoriae non proportionatae viribus poenitentis.  Soluto illo, 
iterum manet reatus et debitum poenae expiativae arbitrariae secundum culpae modum, et vires poenitentis.” 
Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.16, art.2, p.542b. 
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Satisfaction pertains both to impending, external punishment, 
and also to the internal experience of being guilty.   
 That is why, according to Albert, it is not possible for 
someone to repent for only some of the sins that he has 
committed without repenting for all of them.  We may sin one at 
a time, but repentance has to come all at once.  If our sins 
were recorded on some chalk board somewhere, we could erase them 
one at a time, but it is not so.  Every sin is a turning of a 
human person toward a bonum commutabile, a changeable good, that 
is, some good that may be changed or even exchanged for a higher 
good, and these changeable goods are many in number, for 
example, this or that morsel of food, this or that article of 
clothing, etc.  But every sin has its quality of an offense from 
the fact that it is a turning away from the bonum incommutabile, 
the unchangeable good, namely God himself.  The gluttonous act 
is a sin because it is a turning toward this food and a turning 
away from God.  “As long as this aversion remains, the sin 
remains, and man cannot satisfy for one sin while holding to 
another.”61  Either you are turned toward the uncreated good or 
toward a changeable good.  Either you are turned toward God or 
                                                     
61
 “Cum aversio illa maneat, alio quocumque peccato manente, non potest homo satisfacere de uno, alio retento.” 
Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.1, p.471a. 
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toward something else.  “There can be no satisfaction until the 
offense has ceased.”62   
Therefore, someone who is in a state of sin can pay 
the debt [of restitution] but cannot make 
satisfaction, because [restitution] only considers the 
amount of the debt, but satisfaction looks at that and 
also says “may it be according to the will of the good 
pleasure of the one being satisfied.”63 
  
 Given what was said about the common sense of satisfaction 
in part three of this paper, Albert’s opposition to partial 
sacramental satisfaction should not be surprising, because it 
has parallel features.  In the common sense of the term, it is 
not right to say that someone has partially satisfied his 
thirst.  Either the person has satisfied his thirst, or he 
hasn’t.  Either he has had enough, or he hasn’t.  Being only 
partially satisfied is not being satisfied enough, but 
satisfaction is precisely the condition of having had enough 
(satis).   
 In the case of satisfaction, according to the common sense, 
in response to some harm being done, again, we would not speak 
of partial satisfaction.  Thus, if Jack stole two watches from 
Jill, he may, indeed, make partial restitution, by returning 
only one watch, but he may not make partial satisfaction, by 
baking her half a cake or saying half of “I’m sorry” or buying 
                                                     
62
 “Non potest sibi satisfieri, nisi offensa cesset.”  Ibid. 
63
 “Ideo in peccato existens potest solvere debitum, sed non satisfacere: quia solutio tantum respicit quantitatem 
debiti, sed satisfactio hanc respicit, et adhuc dicit ut fiat secundum voluntatem beneplaciti ejus cui fit.”  Super 
Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.9, p.481b. 
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her half a bunch of flowers.  Either Jack and Jill will be 
restored to a condition of friendship and unity of wills, or the 
relationship will remain damaged.   
 Or, if we consider the common juridical sense of the term 
“satisfaction,” if Jack stole two watches, he could not resume 
his place in society until he made satisfaction for both.  
Either Jack has done his time, or he hasn’t.  So long as he 
hasn’t, Jack cannot resume his place in society.   
 Today’s reader might object that Albert’s teaching on 
satisfaction is too focused on justice, and does not adequately 
reckon with God as a God of mercy.  Does it make sense for 
divine justice to demand satisfaction when human justice does 
not?  And don’t the scriptures say “mercy triumphs over 
judgment?”64  This objection will not hold much water when it is 
recalled, as was said above, that even in human affairs, there 
is no partial satisfaction.  As long as an offender refuses to 
make satisfaction he is persevering in his offense, and human 
justice rationally demands that the offense come to an end.  
This is not due to the whims of some judge, but to the real 
features of human nature.  God’s mercy is neither unjust nor 
irrational.   
 It must be mentioned that to make satisfaction, according 
to Albert, not only must a person have stopped sinning, but the 
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 Jam 2:13. 
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person must also be in a state of grace.  Satisfaction is about 
pleasing the person whom we satisfy, so that the previous harm 
may be overcome.   
Acts that seek to please God must be done according to 
the divine will and esteem (acceptio).  God’s esteem 
does not originate in us, or in our work, nor is it 
achieved by our work, but we get it from God and it 
sanctifies us, therefore, such works have to be 
performed in the state of sanctifying grace.
65
    
 
God cannot be satisfied, except by someone who is in the state 
of grace.   
 This does seem to raise a chicken-before-the-egg problem 
which Albert does not address.  The purpose of satisfaction is 
to restore us to God’s friendship, but we cannot make 
satisfaction unless God has already favored us with sanctifying 
grace, which seems to indicate that we were already in God’s 
friendship, but if we were already in God’s friendship, then we 
would not need to make satisfaction.  So, which comes first: the 
satisfaction or the sanctifying grace?  If you choose 
satisfaction, then you destroy the classical doctrine of grace 
and you espouse some version of pelagianism, because you end up 
with the situation of man pleasing God without God’s grace.  If 
you say that sanctifying grace comes first, then you would seem 
to obviate the need for making satisfaction at all.  Albert 
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 “Opera in quibus quaeritur placatio Dei, sint facta secundum voluntatem et acceptionem divinam: acceptio 
autem Dei non est in nobis ex nobis, nec in opere nostro ex nobis, vel ex opere nostro, sed potius ex eo quod 
accepimus ab ipso: et hoc est gratum faciens: et ideo oportet talia opera esse facta in gratia gratum faciente.” 
Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.10, p.484b. 
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seems to prefer this latter option, but he does not address the 
apparent inconsistency.   
 Albert might have defended his position by arguing that we 
make satisfaction for our own sakes, and not for God’s.  Such an 
explanation would be analogous to the explanation Albert gives 
for how our sins harm God.  Strictly speaking, our sin can in no 
way do any harm to God,
66
 because God, in his absolute 
perfection, is not subject to change of any kind, let alone 
harm.  Nevertheless, by sinning we try to harm God from our own 
point of view, as much as our state of affairs will allow.  
Thus, whoever sins is living as if he is harming God, and his 
condition does not get fixed merely by realizing that God is 
perfect and immutable.  He must strive to please God, from his 
own point of view, by making satisfaction, just as he had 
already strove to harm God, from his point of view, by sinning.  
But, he cannot do so without sanctifying grace.  Thus, 
sanctifying grace comes first, and satisfaction comes second, 
and the chicken-before-the-egg dilemma is avoided.  
 Albert considers the notion of satisfaction, in the 
sacramental sense, to be operative in scripture, although 
scripture itself does not use the term in that sense.  Thus to 
the objection, concerning Peter’s weeping after denying Christ, 
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 “Licet enim peccator Deum laedere non possit, tamen quantum est de se laedit.”  Super Sententiarum (ed. 
Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.1, p.471a. 
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that “I read about Peter’s tears, not about his satisfaction,”67 
Albert admits that “it doesn’t say ‘satisfaction,’ but 
nevertheless” he insists, “natural law would not allow him to 
forgo satisfaction, if he sinned.”68   
 Albert deduces his satisfaction theory from natural law, 
the law of human nature, which was active in the scriptures, 
even if not formally declared there.  Another example is the way 
that contrition, confession and satisfaction, the three parts of 
the sacrament of penance, are evident to Albert in the parable 
of the Pharisee and the tax collector in Luke 18:9-14.   
For the tax collector also merited pardon, because in 
his humility he was sorrowful and lowered his eyes, 
and in his prayer he confessed the truth about 





Another example of the scriptural basis of satisfaction was 
mentioned above: that the authority of the priest to “bind” 
satisfaction upon the penitent is rooted in Matthew 16:19.   
 There are two groups of people today who can make 
satisfaction, according to Albert.  The Church militant, that is 
those Christians still on Earth, at various times in the 
liturgical calendar, makes satisfaction by undertaking 
                                                     
67
 "Lacrymas Petri lego, satisfactionem non lego." Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.17, art.33, 
p.704b. 
68
 “Non legit satisfactionem : et tamen naturale jus non permittit quin satisfecerit, si peccavit.” Super Sententiarum 
(ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.17, art.33, p.705a. 
69
   “Hoc enim etiam in Publicano meruit condonationem, qui ex humilitate confusus depressit oculos, et in 
oratione de se veritatem confitebatur, et in afflictione satisfactionis tutudit pectus.” De mysterio missae (ed. 





  The church suffering, that is, 
the souls in purgatory, is engaged full time in a labor of 
satisfaction.
71
   
 Can those of us on earth help the souls in purgatory by 
making satisfaction on their behalf?  Albert takes it for 
granted that the traditional Catholic teaching is correct: of 
course they can.  In fact, an innocent party, in general, may 
make satisfaction on behalf of a guilty party according to 
Albert.
72
  However, this idea that someone may satisfy for his 
own sins or for someone else’s will cause a bit of a problem and 
the next part of this thesis we will come back to it.   
 An important takeaway from this part, that will reappear in 
the next part as well, is that sacramental satisfaction works to 
undo guilt that is in the guilty party.  Satisfaction is not 
about balancing some celestial scales, but rather healing 
individuals who suffer harm as a result of their own sins.   
  
                                                     
70
 “In diebus autem profestis et in diebus luctus, sicut in jejunio, nisi sit jejunium exsultationis, sicut in Pentecoste, 
[Gloria] non cantatur : quia tunc timentes iram de peccatis satisfacimus, et pacem nondum adhuc donatam nobis 
commemoramus.” De mysterio missae (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.1, cap.3, p.21b. 
71
 “Illi autem omnes vel sunt in via adhuc poenitentes, vel in purgatorio satisfacientes luendo in poenis quod 
fecerunt.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.20, art.18, p.855a. 
72
 “Unde poena se habet ad culpam ut medicina expiativa : et ideo infligitur innocentibus, ut satisfaciant pro aliis : 
cum tamen non infligatur nisi pro peccatis propriis vel alienis.” Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars II, 
tract.22, q.131, m.2, p.437b. 
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Part Five: The Soteriological Sense 
 
 According to Albert, Christ’s death was the most apt way 
for satisfaction to be made on our behalf, because it preserves 
justice and mercy.  As was explained in part three of this 
paper, when a thief steals something, in justice, he owes two 
things: restitution of the stolen object when possible, and 
satisfaction according to the enormity of the offense.  Thus, 
today, we would expect a diamond thief not only to restore the 
stolen diamonds, but also to make satisfaction by doing some 
jail time.  The amount of jail time will depend upon several 
factors: the thief’s criminal record, extenuating circumstances, 
the value of the diamonds, etc.  In the case of soteriology, 
humanity’s first ancestor, Adam, was a thief, because he stole 
God’s honor by sinning.  Thus Adam and his children owe God both 
restitution of the lost honor and satisfaction.   
 The analogy at this point may seem a little strained, 
because, as Albert states, “a sinner cannot harm God.  
Nevertheless,” he contends, “as much as it is in him he does 
harm God.”73  Thus, a person who, by sinning, dishonors God, does 
not decrease God’s honor per se, but he does do so from his own 
point of view.  There is room here for Albert to explain more 
precisely the relationship between theft and dishonor.  He could 
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 “Peccator Deum laedere non possit, tamen quantum est de se laedit.”  Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-
4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.1, p.471a. 
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have done more to flesh out what it means to really take 
someone’s honor from them, and then he could explain how this 
applies to dishonoring God.     
 After Adam’s theft, justice and friendship equally demanded 
that both restitution and satisfaction had to be made.  Not only 
did  God’s honor have to be restored, but something extra had to 
be given, according to the enormity of the offense.  Because God 
is infinite, the enormity of the offense is also infinite.  
Thus, an offering of infinite worth was needed.  Even if a human 
being could restore the honor that had been stolen, the guilt 
would still remain, until satisfaction could be made for the 
infinite enormity of the offense.  Thus, it was fitting 
(conveniens) for a God-man to pay the debt of satisfaction, 
since such a being would be in debt as a man, and capable of 
paying, as God.
74
   
 A key part of satisfaction as a soteriological theory is 
the idea that human beings are or were in debt to God.  Such 
indebtedness is not the invention of medieval minds obsessed 
with juridical or feudal categories.  Rather, indebtedness to 
God has been a key part of Christianity from the beginning.  The 
Our Father contains the petition: “forgive us our debts, as we 
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 Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.13, art.14, p.331b. 
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forgive our debtors,”75 and Jesus offered many parables 
explaining the notion of human indebtedness to God.
76
  According 
to Albert, these “debts are what we ought to be paying to God 
through satisfaction.”77  Albert distinguishes three types of 
debts that we owe to God.  The first is the debt that we owe 
from the fact of creation.  Because God freely gave us 
everything that we have, “we owe him more than we realize.”78  
The second debt comes from sin.  By sinning we dishonor God, 
offending His infinite majesty, and we therefore owe him more 
than we could ever pay, even if we had until the end of the 
world to do so.  The third debt comes from God’s mercy, and this 
debt is so slight that even a frail man could pay it.  When God, 
in His mercy, remits the other debts that we owe, all he asks of 
us, in return, is that we do His will, and this can be called a 
debt, in the sense that we owe it to God to do His will, because 
He has been merciful to us.
79
   
 If it is true that we owe God so much, then a problem 
arises.  “The more a service is owed, the less pleasing the 
service becomes.”80  For example, if someone gives you a free cup 
of coffee, that act is more pleasing to you, and you are more 
                                                     
75
 “Et dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris.” “καὶ ἄφες ἡμῖν τὰ ὀφειλήματα 
ἡμῶν, ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀφήκαμεν τοῖς ὀφειλέταις ἡμῶν·” (Matt 6:12).  
76
 Cf. Matt 18:23-35, Matt 25:14-30. 
77
 “Debita sunt quae reddere debemus per satisfactionem Deo.” De mysterio missae (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.3, 
cap.20, p.153a. 
78




 “Quanto magis debita sunt servitia, tanto minus sunt grata.” Ibid.  
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grateful, than if you had been given a cup of coffee by someone 
who owed it to you, because you just paid her a fair price for 
it.  So, if we owe God so much by virtue of our creation and of 
our sin, then it seems we can never be pleasing (grati) to Him.  
Not even the martyrs, then, could have been pleasing (grati) to 
God.  The problem is that this would do grave harm to 
traditional Catholic understanding of grace (gratia), which 
explains how we do become pleasing (grati) to God.  Albert’s 
explanation is that the martyrs paid to God what they owed by 
virtue of their creation, but that they did so in a most 
pleasing way (gratissime), that is, freely.
81
  We, too, are 
pleasing to God when we give Him what we already owe Him, doing 
so in a pleasing way.   
 Given that we had incurred debts to God that we could not 
repay, Albert’s view is that Jesus Christ paid the price of 
those debts on our behalf, making both restitution and 
satisfaction.
82
  Christ did so by meriting our satisfaction.  
Christ merited things for himself and for us by his virtues, 
such as his humility, obedience and charity.
83
 
 Albert considers the question of whether it was possible 
for God to save us in some other way than he did.  Anselm had 




 “‘Jesus Nazarenus, rex Judaeorum.’ In quibus quatuor verbis effectus Crucis notantur : quia per satisfactionem 
pro nobis et solutionem pretii, est ‘Jesus,’ auctor salutis nostrae.” Super Iohannem (ed. Borgnet, 1899), in cap.19, 
v.19-22, p.656b. 
83
 Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.18, art.4, p.317a. 
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answered this question in the negative, but Albert provides many 
distinctions and nuances.  His first distinction is between God 
and us.  “Another way was possible,” he says, “considering God’s 
power... but from our point of view, it was impossible for us to 
be redeemed except by a God-man.”84  Albert’s answer to this 
question affirms the limitations of human thought.  Some things 
that seem impossible to us, are, from God’s point of view, 
possible.  “Thus, if it be asked,” says Albert, “whether a calf 
can be made from a tree-trunk, I say ‘no,’ but if it be asked 
whether God is able to make a calf from a tree-trunk, we say 
‘yes.’”85   
 Albert’s answer to the necessity question not only 
identifies some limits of human thought, it also gives an 
insight into why God saved us the way He did.  He chose to 
respect our experience of friendship, sin and reconciliation.  
There is something in us that makes us believe that God had to 
save us the way he did.  In other words, there was not some debt 
floating out there in some celestial balance sheet that God just 
could not ignore.  It is that it would be impossible for us to 
grasp the idea of our salvation taking place without 
satisfaction being made for the debt which we had incurred.  God 
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 “Alius fuit modus possibilis, considerata potestate Dei... sed tamen ex parte nostra impossibile fuit nos redimi 
nisi per Deum et hominem.”  Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.20, art.1, p.356b. 
85
“Si enim quaeratur, Utrum de trunco potest fieri vitulus ? dicimus quod non. Si autem quaeratur, Utrum Deus de 
trunco potest facere vitulum ? dicimus quod sic.” Ibid. p. 357a. 
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chose to save us in a way that would respect our understanding 
of sin and satisfaction.   
 Could God have saved us while ignoring the debt we owed?  
Could he have forgiven us without our making satisfaction?  Yes.  
According to Albert, instead of our paying the full penalty, we 
could have paid only an appropriate penalty (condigna poena), 
perhaps by undergoing various chastisements on this earth and in 
purgatory, and there would be nothing wrong with doing so, from 
God’s point of view.86  But there would be something unbecoming 
(incongruum) about this from our point of view.  Although God is 
not constrained by our notions of what is becoming and 
unbecoming,
87
 nevertheless, he did, in fact, choose to save us in 
a way that accorded with our understanding.   
 The reason it would be unbecoming (incongruum), from our 
point of view, for us to be saved by God in some other way, 
without satisfaction being made, is that “from our point of 
view, a feeling of shame would remain, since man had taken 
something that he had not repaid.”88  Albert also acknowledges 
that God could also simply take away that feeling of shame, but 
he denies that God could change the truth of what happened, and 
the truth is that the first man, by sinning, stole something 
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 Ibid. p. 357a.  
87
 “Ad aliud dicendum quod congruum et incongruum ex parte nostra sumuntur, et non ex parte judicii Dei, cui 
congruum est omne quod facit: quia etiam illud quod videtur incongruum ex contrario usu, si Deus faceret, 
congruissimum esset.” Ibid. p. 357a.  
88
 “Ex parte hominis remansisset verecundia, scilicet quod homo abstulisset quod non reddidiesset.” Ibid. p. 357b.  
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that he could not repay.  Thus, it was most becoming 
(congruissimum) that “man, by repaying as much as or more than 
he stole, would be freed at once from sin and from shame,”89 and 
this is exactly what Albert’s version of theory of satisfaction 
accounts for.   
 One of the pitfalls of a cursory reading of Albert is that 
some statements, taken out of context, lead the reader to a 
false conclusion.  L.W. Grensted wrote that  
Albert the Great argues in favour of the necessity of 
the Atonement, but on different grounds from those 
given by Anselm.  Original sin, he says, being a 
corruption of the nature derived from Adam, the 
natural head of the race, can only be remitted through 
a supernatural second Head, since a second natural 
Head is unthinkable.
90
   
 
He cites Albert’s commentary on distinction 20 of book III of 
the Sentences, without mentioning the article he has in mind.  
His interpretation is false, because in the same distinction, 
Albert clearly states that “sin is not remitted except by a God-
man satisfying on our behalf, although another way was possible” 
(emphasis added).
91
 Perhaps Grensted was referring to Albert’s 
arguments in that same article denying that God could have saved 
us by creating a second (natural) Adam.   
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 “Homo tantum vel plus dando quam rapuit, ab approbrio simul et peccato liberaretur.” Ibid. p. 357b.  
90
 Grensted, Doctrine of the Atonement, 147. 
91
 “Non remittitur peccatum nisi Deo et homine satisfaciente pro nobis, licet alius modus fuerit possibilis.” Super 
Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.20, art.VII, p.366a. 
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 Readers may also be confused by a statement of Albert’s 
that “there was no other method possible for our redemption, but 
the payment of such a price.”  It may sound as if Albert is 
affirming Anselmian necessity on this point, but, in fact, he is 
not.  From the context, Albert is talking about one aspect of 
soteriological theory: redemption.  The full quotation makes 
this clear:   
There was no other method possible for our redemption 
but the payment of such a price, unless ‘redemption’ 
is taken in the wide sense, as equivalent to 
‘liberation.’92   
 
Thus, for Albert, there were various possible ways of 
“liberation,” which is “redemption” in the broad sense, but only 
one possible way of “redemption” in the narrow, strict sense.  
It was necessary for Albert to use technical meanings of 
“redemption” in this article because he is arguing against the 
theory that we were redeemed from slavery to the Devil by some 
transaction between Christ and the Devil.   
 Albert considers the criticism of his satisfaction theory 
that uses an analogy of a human judge.  It would be wrong for a 
human judge to demand a payment from the guilty party that was 
more than the guilty party could pay.  But, in satisfaction 
theory, God is a judge who demands more than fallen human beings 
can pay.  To avoid the blasphemous conclusion that God is a 
                                                     
92
 “Solutio... Non fuit alius modus possibilis nostrae redemptionis, nisi per pretii talis solutionem, nisi redemptio 
large pro liberatione accipiatur.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.20, art.III, p.360a. 
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wicked judge, we must admit, it seems, that fallen human beings 
were, in fact, capable of repaying to God what was lost, that 
is, that they could make restitution and satisfaction on their 
own.  Albert replies
93
 by admitting that it would, indeed, be 
extortion for a judge to demand more than the guilty party could 
pay, unless the judge himself was willing to make the payment 
from his own funds.  Because God wanted human beings to be 
restored to their original dignity, and not to be afflicted by 
any guilty conscience for having taken honor from God what they 
could not repay, God did demand more than we could pay, but He 
also helped to foot the bill, as Psalm 111:9 says: “The Lord 
sent redemption to his people.” 
 Another objection to Albert’s satisfaction theory is that 
it is a cruel to withhold forgiveness until the death of an 
innocent person.  How could God be so cruel?  Could He not have 
forgiven our sins without the death of His innocent Son?  
Albert’s response is to fall back upon the work of Anselm, and 
affirm that God the Father did not have some thirst for blood 
that needed to be satisfied.
94
  Rather, the Father is perfectly 
just and merciful.  He mercifully sent his Son to man, so that 
his Son could make just satisfaction on man’s behalf.   
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 But to some this explanation may seem unjust.  Taking the 
punishment that a guilty party deserves and inflicting it upon 
an innocent party, so that the guilty party can go unpunished 
makes little sense.  Albert’s reply is that it would truly be a 
sin for a judge to act in such a way motivated by cruelty and 
perversity.
95
  But, if the judge did so for the sake of justice, 
and for the correction and help of the guilty party, then such a 
judge would prove himself to be both just and merciful.  This 
shows that, for Albert, satisfaction does not pertain to some 
nebulous debt floating somewhere out there in the universe, in 
some celestial balance sheet, or in God himself.  Satisfaction 
is for the correction and help of the guilty party.  The debt 
exists in us, and by paying it, we are corrected and helped.   
 It was mentioned, in the previous part of this thesis, that 
souls here on earth could make satisfaction on behalf of the 
souls in purgatory, and that it is possible for one party to 
satisfy for another.  For example, one party, Jesus Christ, made 
satisfaction for another party, the rest of humanity.  However, 
this affirmation of vicarious satisfaction does seem to 
contradict a key part of Anselmian satisfaction theory: that the 
God-man had to be man in order to share our debt, because 
otherwise he could not satisfy on our behalf.  In fact, in 
explaining the incarnation, Albert makes this point explicit:  





In this way, therefore, from those things which 
pertain to Godhead He had the power to save: but 
because, before a just judge, no one may make 
satisfaction except the one who is in debt, He had to 
assume something of our condition so that He would owe 




In one place, Albert writes that one party may satisfy on behalf 
of another, and, in another place, he denies it.   
 Albert could have argued (but did not) that the key to 
unravelling this apparent contradiction is understanding the 
relationship between the two parties.  If the party making 
satisfaction is not really connected to the guilty party, then 
the objection against vicarious satisfaction stands.  But if, on 
the other hand, they are connected by a very strong bond, then 
it does become possible for one party to satisfy for the other.  
In Albert’s ecclesiology, Christian believers are united to 
Christ as body parts are united to their head, and all 
Christians are united to each other, since they are in the same 
mystical body of Christ.   
 Thus, Christ did satisfy on our behalf.
97
  
A punishment satisfies for sin both in the head and in 
the members, and therefore, it is by the mercy of God 
that a punishment is sometimes inflicted upon us, as 
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 “Sic ergo ex his quae deitatis sunt, facultatem habet salvandi : sed quia apud justum judicem non satisfacit nisi 
qui debet, ideo ex nostro assumpsit, unde pro nobis satisfacere deberet.” De mysterio missae (ed. Borgnet, 1899), 
tract.1, cap.3, p.30b. 
97 “Totam tuam, o Pater, voluntatem in sanctificando homines et satisfaciendo pro ipsis perficiens.” De corpore 
domini (ed. Borgnet, 1899), dist.5, cap.4, p.350b. 
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also upon [Christ] the head, so that satisfaction may 
take place.
98
   
 
Thus, if a thief steals a watch with his left hand, he may 
restore the watch with his right hand and also make some 
satisfaction, for example, pay some fee, with his right hand.  
Because the hands are joined together in one body, one member 
can make satisfaction for the other.  The key to this sort of 
unity between the head and members, according to Albert, is a 
unity of wills.  “Satisfaction cannot be wholly alien, because 
it is owed by the spirit, and therefore it must be voluntary.”99  
In other words, the one on whose behalf satisfaction is being 
made must join his will to the one that makes satisfaction.  In  
more concrete terms, the Christian believer must will, or at 
least strive to will, what Christ wills, otherwise, the 
satisfaction achieved by Christ will be alien to him.   
 This raises two points: first of all, what does it mean for 
a Christian to will what Christ willed in his passion?  In order 
to will something directly, it must be perceived as good.  But 
how could anyone think it good for an innocent person to be 
betrayed, mocked, tortured and crucified?  In what sense, then, 
was the passion a good thing?  Albert gives “four reasons why 
the death of Christ must be called ‘good’ absolutely and without 
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 “Poena est satisfactoria pro peccato tam in membris, quam in capite : et ideo ex misericordia Dei inflicta 
quandoque nobis, et capiti, ut per eam fiat satisfactio.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.II, dist.36, 
art.2, p.586a. 
99
 “Satisfactio non potest esse omnino aliena, quia a spiritu debetur, et ideo voluntariam oportet esse.” Super 
Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.II, dist.32, art.1, p.521b. 
Nichols 41 
 
distinction.”100  Each reason focuses on one positive aspect of 
the passion.  To wrestle with these positive aspects, and 
consider whether they outweigh the harmful aspects is to undergo 
a process like that of Christ, Himself, in the garden of 
Gethsemane. 
 The second point that arises from the necessity of a union 
of wills between head and members is that participation in the 
satisfaction wrought by Christ requires willing compliance and 
is, therefore, not applicable to those who deny Christ.  The 
satisfaction of Christ is “sufficient for all people but not 
efficient.”101  In other words, Christ’s satisfaction is real, 
but we are not forced to accept it against our wills.  It is up 
to us whether we accept it or not, and we may even do so on 
behalf of young children.  As Albert says, “another person’s 
faith is enough for [Christ’s] satisfaction to be efficacious 
for the baptized.”102    
 One topic that Albert could have explored further is why 
Christ’s humility and obedience would count as satisfaction 
before God.  Given that sacramental penance may be some 
combination of prayer, fasting and almsgiving, we might wonder 
why Christ went to such an extreme as crucifixion.  In other 
                                                     
100
 “Dicendum, quod mors Christi absolute et sine distinctione optima dicenda est quattuor rationibus.” Super 
Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.20, art.13, p.371b. 
101
 “...poenam pro omnibus satisfacientem sufficienter, licet non efficienter.” Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 
1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.13, art.25, p.374a. 
102 “Sufficit fides aliena ut valeat baptizatis illa satisfactio.”  Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, 
dist.6, art.1, p.118b. 
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words, what was it about enduring torture, abandonment and death 
that made them the preferred means of satisfaction, such that 
the satisfaction that came from the crucifixion had an effect 
that would not have been available merely from Christ’s acts of 
prayer, fasting and almsgiving?
103
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 Cf. J. Patout Burns, SJ, “The Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory,” Theological Studies 
36(1975), 296.  
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Part Six: Conclusion 
 We see in the works of Albert the Great a critical espousal 
and a promotion of Anselm’s satisfaction theory.  Albert accepts 
the core parts of the theory: that humanity owed a debt to God 
as a result of Adam’s sin, that finite humanity was unable to 
pay an infinite debt, that only a God-man could pay that debt, 
since as a man he would share the debt and as a God he would be 
capable of making an infinite payment, and that Jesus Christ, as 
true God and true man, did, in fact, pay that debt by being 
humble and obedient in undergoing his passion.  Albert gives 
some nuance to Anselm’s theory, by clarifying that from our 
point of view, it was necessary for Christ to redeem us the way 
he did, but that from God’s point of view, other ways were 
possible, even though the way he chose was fitting (conveniens).   
 By carefully studying Albert’s vast literary corpus, we see 
that his version of satisfaction as a soteriological theory is 
built upon his use of the common (non-religious) sense of the 
term, and also upon the sacramental sense.  At the base level, 
Albert talks about satisfying a thirst, for example, or a 
desire, and he talks about making satisfaction for harm done.  
Thus, if Jack harms Jill by stealing her watch, he could satisfy 
her desire for the watch by returning it, which is called 
“restitution,” and he could satisfy her desire for justice by 
paying a fine or going to jail or something similar, and this 
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latter part is “satisfaction,” properly so called.  This also 
applies outside of the judicial sphere.  If Jack and Jill are 
friends, Jack would still make restitution and satisfaction in 
order to restore the damaged friendship.  Perhaps his 
satisfaction would be a gift to Jill or a special kindness of 
some sort: something that would reassure Jill that Jack wanted 
to restore their friendship and their unity of wills.  Justice 
between friends is similar to justice between disputing parties 
in court.   
 Sacramental satisfaction is some act of prayer, fasting or 
almsgiving, as imposed by a priest in the sacrament of penance, 
that allows the penitent not to make restitution for God’s lost 
honor, but rather, to show God that the penitent desires 
justice, desires a restoration of friendship with God, and 
desires a union of wills with God.  Satisfaction of this sort is 
made possible by Christ’s crucifixion, and is an imitation of 
it.  Christ, on his cross made a perfect satisfaction, not only 
restoring God’s lost honor (restitution), but also doing 
something extra (infinitely so), to achieve justice and to 
repair lost friendship.  Christ’s satisfaction is sufficient for 
all humanity, but not efficient, in the sense that it is only 
effective for those who have united themselves to Christ’s 
mystical body the Church.   
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 It is true that this thesis reflects “a growing tendency” 
among modern scholars “to emphasize the moral and spiritual 
features of the atonement and to minimize what were thought to 
be the legalistic and commercial elements in previous accounts 
of it.”104  This tendency is growing because scholars such as 
Hans Küng have criticized Anselm’s satisfaction theory for being 
dominated by legalistic logic, and for lacking an appreciation 
for God’s incomprehensibility and freedom.105  In response, this 
thesis has shown that Albert’s version of satisfaction theory is 
based not merely on legalistic logic, but also on the deeper 
logic of human relationships.  Thus, Albert’s version of 
satisfaction includes legalistic logic, but it is not dominated 
by it.  Furthermore, Albert emphasizes the distinction between 
God’s freedom as it is in itself, and as we perceive it.  Albert 
affirms that God could have chosen to save us in some other way 
than He did, even though we cannot understand what that might 
have been.  Albert sees God as more incomprehensible and more 
free, and, therefore, Küng’s criticism does not apply.   
 According to Robin Ryan, many contemporary theologians 
object to any soteriological theory that sees, in the death of 
Christ, some sort of transaction, as if Christ, by dying, paid 
some sort of a price.  He summarizes the critiques of Elizabeth 
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John McIntyre, The Shape of Soteriology, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992) p. 47. 
105
 Hans Küng, On Being a Christian, trans. Edward Quinn (New York: Doubleday, 1976), 421-424. 
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Johnson, Cynthia Crysdale and Jon Sobrino this way: “If the 
cross is isolated from [Christ’s] ministry and interpreted as a 
transaction between Jesus and God (the Father), it leads to 
magical or even cruel view of redemption.”106  Such criticisms 
apply only partially to Albert’s thought.  Albert does describe 
the death of Christ as the payment of a price (pretium) to God, 
because it was a restoration of the honor that was stolen by 
Adam’s sin.  For Adam’s pride, Christ showed humility, and for 
Adam’s disobedience, Christ showed obedience.  Does this mean 
that God is keeping some celestial balance sheet, and that God 
insists on a perfect reckoning before He would let us into 
heaven?  Not exactly.  Albert does talk about justice, and its 
demands, among which he includes the demand for punishment, but 
he also talks about guilt as it exists in human beings, too.  We 
know ourselves to be in debt, and we feel guilt at having done 
wrong.  Thus, Christ’s satisfaction is, at the end of the day, 
really about something in us, our guilt, because God, strictly 
speaking, was not at a loss as the result of Adam’s sin, as 
Albert repeatedly states.   
 One remaining difficulty for a modern student of medieval 
satisfaction theory is the emphasis it places on divine honor.  
Satisfaction theory reduces Adam’s sin, and all other sins, to 
the theft of honor due to God.  But today’s culture does not 
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 Robin Ryan, Jesus and Salvation, (Collegeville, Liturgical Press, 2015), 133-134. 
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afford students as much appreciation for honor as medieval 
culture did.  It will seem irrational to many modern students 
that anyone would go to great lengths, such as crucifixion, for 
the sake of honor.  One option for today’s defender of 
satisfaction theory is to replace honor with a similar concept, 
while trying to preserve the central structures of the theory.  
Hans Urs Von Balthasar
107
 and Eleonore Stump
108
 are two examples 
of modern authors on this path.  Another option would be to 
distil a remedy for this modern problem by carefully studying 
Albert’s understanding of divine honor,109 and, if possible, 
rehabilitating it.     
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 “We can avoid the medieval side of [Anselm’s satisfaction] theory, that is, the reparation of God’s injured 
honor, but we must substitute for it the idea of a divine love scorned by sin.” Hans Urs Von Balthasar, To the Heart 
of the Mystery of Redemption, trans. Anne Englund Nash, (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 2010), 35. 
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 Cf. Eleonore Stump, “Atonement According to Aquinas,” in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology Volume I, 
ed. Michael Rea, (Oxford University Press, 2009), 267-293. 
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Appendix One:  Editions and Manuscripts 
 Albert most directly addresses the topic of satisfaction as 
a soteriological theory in his commentary on distinction 20 of 
Book III of Peter Lombard’s Sentences.  Therefore, it is 
important to have an accurate version of this text.  The most 
recent edition of Albert’s commentary on Book III of the 
Sentences was edited by Auguste Borgnet and published in 1894 in 
Paris by Louis Vivès.  It comprises volume 28 of the 38 volume 
set of Albert’s Opera Omnia, all of which was edited by Borgnet.  
Working on a 38 volume set, Borgnet hardly had the time to draw 
on manuscript research to produce his edition of Albert’s 
commentary on Book III.  In fact, he was not aware of any 
manuscripts of this commentary at all.
110
  Instead, he in large 
part reproduced Peter Jammy’s Lyon edition of 1651, but with 
updated citations of scripture and of the fathers of the Church, 
and with freshly composed introductory matter.  Borgnet, as 
editor, felt free to make minor stylistic changes to improve the 
readability of the text.  For example, where the Jammy’s edition 
had “in principio 18 distinctionis posita est,” Borgnet edits it 
to read “in principio distinctionis XVIII posita est.”111  
William Kübel, the former director of the Albertus Magnus 
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 Albert the Great, Opera Omnia, ed. Borgnet, (Paris: Louis Vives, 1890-1891) Vol I, p. XLV. 
111
 Super Sententiarum, Lib.III, dist.20, divisio textus. 
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Institute, has noted that the Paris edition also includes 
attempts by the editors to clarify confusing passages.
112
       
 Despite these minor changes, on the whole, Borgnet’s Paris 
edition follows Jammy’s Lyon edition closely.  Borgnet’s 
alterations to Jammy’s text are sparse.  In fact, Borgnet 
follows Jammy so closely that he reproduces some of Jammy’s 
typos.
113
  In essence, today’s students of Albert’s Sentence 
Commentary are relying upon 17
th
 Century scholarship, because 
they have no option but Borgnet’s 19th Century edition, which 
relies almost entirely on Jammy’s 17th Century work.  In the 
preface of the first volume of Jammy’s edition, it is stated 
that he expurgated errors, restored passages, and added 
citations.
114
  In other words, he took the liberty as editor to 
improve the text he was working with.  Did Jammy, in doing so, 
insert himself between his readers and the original author?  
Such editorial “improvement” was not uncommon at that time.  One 
need only recall the commission of Latinists under Pope Urban 
VIII that revised the ancient hymns of the Roman breviary 
according to the neo-classical standards then fashionable.  Pope 
Urban’s “improved” hymns came out in 1632, a mere 19 years 
before Jammy finished his work on the Lyon edition of Albert’s 




 For example, both editions have: “... quia hoc nullus debet subiipsi subtrahere, ...” Super Sententiarum, Lib.IV, 
dist.15, art.17, solutio. 
114
 “... a mendis expurgavit, innumeris locis restituit, citationibus quae desiderabantur illustravit...” Opera Omnia, 
Ed. Jammy (Lyon, 1651), Volume 1, no page.   
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Opera Omnia.  The same revisionist spirit that motivated the 
papal commission may also have motivated Jammy’s work.  A 
critical edition of Albert’s Sentence commentary, using modern 
methods, is desperately needed, if for no other reason than to 
appreciate the editorial interventions of Jammy in 1632 and 
Borgnet in 1894.   
 A 1982 catalog lists thirteen known manuscripts of Albert’s 
commentary on Book III of Lombard’s Sentences.115  Four are from 
the thirteenth century, six are from the fourteenth century, and 
three are from the fifteenth century.  Neither the Lyon nor the 
Paris editions of Albert’s Opera Omnia make any reference to 
manuscripts.  The University of Heidelberg has made one 
manuscript of Albert’s commentary on Book III of the Sentences 
available online: Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047.  This manuscript was 
written in France in the fourteenth century, and taken to the 
famous library of the University of Heidelberg in the Palatinate 
region of Germany.  In 1623, at the end of the Thirty Years’ 
War, the city was conquered and the library was sacked.  Pope 
Gregory XVI ordered the contents of the library to be brought to 
Rome.  One hundred and ninety-six crates of books were shipped 
across the Alps to Rome, becoming the Vatican Palatinate 
Library.  The manuscript studied here, Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047 
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 Winfried Fauser, Die Werke des Albertus Magnus in Ihrer Handschriftlichen Überlieferung, (Wesphalia: 
Aschendorff, 1982), 281.  
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remains in Rome to this day, but it is thanks to the 
digitization project of the University of Heidelberg that the 
manuscript is available on the internet to all scholars.
116
  
There is a  change in penmanship between folios 138r and 138v 
that indicates that two different scribes copied distinction 20.   
 By comparing Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047 to Borgnet’s Paris 
edition of distinction 20, thousands of alterations become 
apparent.  As Jammy remarked, above, most differences pertain to 
stylistic concerns, such as word order.  Some alterations 
pertain to citations of scripture or of the Fathers of the 
Church, and many pertain to changes of Albert’s ideas, as 
indicated in the footnotes of the following transcription.  In 
most of these cases, the Borgnet edition makes more sense.  For 
example: the heading of article one in Borgnet talks about 
whether another method was possible, but the same heading in 
Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047 talks about whether another method was 
possible for God.  Given that the lengthy article discusses 
things that are possible for God and things that are possible 
for us and things that are possible, Borgnet’s reading, 
following Jammy is more sensible.  But there are some cases 
where Borgnet’s reading is inferior.  For example, in the 
solution to article five, Borgnet has Albert say that “no method 
could be just on God’s part,” where Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047 has 





“no method would be unjust on God’s part.”  See note 203 below.  
The reading from Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047, in this instance, makes 





Figure 1: Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047, folio 135r.  Albert the Great, 
Commentary on Book III of The Sentences of Peter Lombard, 




Appendix Two: Transcription of Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047 
Albert the Great’s Commentary on The Sentences of Peter Lombard 
Book III, Distinction 20 
[f 134c]  [Mg] xx Distinctio 
[Divisio Textus] 
 “Si vero quaeritur, utrum alio modo posset Deus hominem 
liberare.”  Hic incipit quarta pars illius divisionis quae in 
principio xviii distinctionis posita est.  Et agitur hic utrum 
Deus alio modo quam per mortem potuerit liberare: et durat usque 
ad illum locum, ubi dicitur in hac eadem distinctione, “Christus 
ergo est sacerdos, idemque hostia.” 
 Et dividitur in partes duas: in quarum prima ostendit 
rationes congruae, quare isto modo voluit redimere, cum alius 
modus esset ei
117
 possibilis.  In secunda, exsequitur causam 
inter Deum, et hominem, et diabolum, ibi, “Si enim tres illi in 
causam,” etc.    
 In prima parte tria facit, scilicet quaestionem proponit, 
et secundo, causam solutionis unam dat ex juvantibus ad spem 
immortalitatis; tertio, dat aliam ex ratione convenientiae.
118
  
Et haec tria facit in uno capitulo: et ex hoc patet sententia.      
[Articulus I] 
 [Mg] Utrum Deus alio modo hominem a peccato diaboli 
potuerit liberare. 
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 Paris om. “ei.” 
118
 Paris: “justitiae.” 
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 Incidit autem hic dubium primo, si est alius modus Deo
119
 
possibilis, ut dicit, vel non?  Et si hoc verum est, quod alius 
modus est Deo
120
 possibilis: tunc quaeritur secundo, ex qua 
potestate
121
 sit ille possibilis? 
 [1.
122
] Ad primum autem proceditur sic.  Dicit enim Anselmus 
quod minimum inconveniens decentissimae justitiae Dei est 
impossibile, cum ergo maximum inconveniens sit injustitia 
judicii, et praecipue [f 134d] coram judice illo a quo non est 
ad alium appellare.  Ergo sustinere injustitiam inconveniens
123
 
est Deo, sed peccatum sine condigna satisfactione remittere est 
injustum judicium: ergo hoc impossibile est Deo.  Probatum autem 
est supra, et adhuc probatur amplius, non potuisse facere 
condignam satisfactionem pro peccato nisi Deum et hominem:  hoc 
enim dixit Ambrosius in praecedenti distinctione: ergo videtur 
alium modum non fuisse possibile.   
 [2.] Item, convenientia et inconvenientia
124
 opponuntur: aut 
igitur in genere naturae, aut in genere moris.  Constat quia 
prout hic loquitur de his non opponuntur in genere naturae: quia 
non loquitur de opere naturae, sed voluntatis, quod est 
liberatio:  ergo opponuntur in genere moris: ergo si congruum 
est bonum, oportet quod incongruum sit malum, quia bonum bono 
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non opponitur: sed Deus vel Filius Dei non potest facere malum: 
ergo non potest facere incongruum. Si igitur alius modus non 
fuit congruus nostrae miseriae sanandae, alius modus non fuit 
Deo possibilis.  
 [3.] Item, ut dicit Anselmus, cum quaeritur utrum alio modo 
liberari
125
 potuit genus humanum? non quaeritur modus ex parte 
Dei qui omnia potest, sed ex parte nostra: ergo hoc est 
quaerere, si alio modo exire poteramus de reatu peccati?  
Constat autem quod non nisi per Deum satisfacientem, qui etiam 
homo esset, ut dicit Anselmus et probat: ergo alius modus non 
fuit nobis
126
 possibilis, et hoc quaeritur hic.  Ergo simpliciter 
alius modus non fuit nobis possibilis.
127
 
 [4.] Item, hoc videntur expresse dicere quaedam 
auctoritates, quarum prima est, ad Titum, ii, glossa super 
illud, Apparuit gratia,
128
 etc., dicit sic: “Non essemus 
participes divinitatis ejus, nisi ipse particeps esset nostrae 
mortalitatis.”  Cum igitur non sumus participes, nisi per 
gratiam reconciliationis, non essemus reconciliati, nisi in 
nostra humanitate mortuus esset pro nobis.   
 Item, ad Rom., v, super illud, Sicut per inobedientiam 
unius,
129
 etc., glossa: “illa fides sana est, qua credimus nullum 
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hominem sive per universalem
130
 aetatis, sive majoris, liberari a 
contagio mortis antiquae, et obligatione peccati, quam prima 
nativitas contraxit, nisi per mediatorem Dei et hominum, et 
hominem Christum Jesum, cujus saluberrima fide illi salvi facti 
sunt.”  
 Item, Anselmus in libro Cur Deus homo: “non potuit transire 
calicem nisi biberet, non quia non posset vitare mortem si 
vellet, sed (sicut dictum est) impossibile est aliter salvare 
mundum.”131   





 etc., glossa: “nisi Christus 
moreretur,
134
 et non redemptus periret, et frustra essent omnia 
facta.”   
 Ex his et multis aliis videtur concludi, quod non erat 
alius modus possibilis ad liberandum genus humanum. 
 [5.]  Item quidam objiciunt sic: Deus illum modum 
praeviderat et praedestinaverat [f. 135a] quia praedestinatio 
est de omnibus bonis salutaribus: sed quod praedestinatum est, 
impossibile est non esse, ergo necessarium est esse, ergo alius 
modus non fuit possibilis quia impossibile non esse
135
 et necesse 
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esse, et possibile non esse, sunt contradictoriae in quarto et 
secundo modo modalium. 
 [6.] Item, fides patriarcharum credidit hunc modum: fidei 
autem non potest subesse falsum: ergo fuit necesse esse hunc 
modum liberationis: ergo non fuit possibile esse alium.  
 Sed contra: 
 Gregorius in Moralibus in xx, “Qui nos existere fecit ex 
nihilo, revocare etiam sine morte sua et passione potuit.” 
 Item, Leo Papa in legenda in ramis palmarum: “omnipotentia 
Filii Dei quae propter eamdem essentiam est aequalis Patri, 
potuisset genus humanum a diaboli demonio solo imperio 
voluntatis suae exuere, nisi divinis operibus maxime congruisset 
ut nequitiae hostilis adversitas de eo quod vicerat 
vinceretur.”136 
 Item, Augustinus in libro de Trinitate viii contra illos 
qui dicunt “defuitne alius modus Deo quo liberaret a miseria ut 
hominem fieri vellet unigenitum filium suum humanam naturam
137
 
induendo et carnem sic est refellere, ut istum modum bonum 
asseramus et congruum divinae deitati: verum etiam ut ostendamus 
alium possibilem Deo non defuisse, cujus potestati aequaliter 
cuncta subjacent, sed sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientiorem  
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modum alium non fuisse.”138   
 Item, super illud Psalmi: Et non ad insipientiam mihi,
139
 
Glossa: “ut sapienter genus humanum meo sanguine liberaretur: 
nullus enim convenientior modus nostrae liberationis, quam ut 
homo qui per superbiam cecidit, per humilitatem resurgat.”  
 Ad hoc etiam sunt rationes non solum probantes, quod alius 
modus fuit possibilis, sed etiam quod alius fuit magis congruus. 
 [1.] Sic dignum enim honore non congruit pati poenas et 
exilium.  Filius autem fuit dignus omni honore: ergo non debebat 
sibi hoc ad injuriam facere, ut poenas et exsilium subiret.  
 [2.] Item, sine satisfactione remittere peccatum fuisset 
majoris perfectionis: ergo fuisset Deo perfectissimo magis 
congruus ille modus.  Probatio primae quia ad hoc nos invitat, 
ut diligamus inimicos, et ut dimittamus debentibus nobis, etiam 
post hoc quod exigamus satisfactionem.  Si ergo bonum suadet 
nobis, ipse debuit primo bonum facere in seipso.    
 Item, si dicas quod seipsum negare non potuit: negasset 
autem seipsum si faceret contra justitiam suam.  Contra: Sicut 
ipse est justitia sua, ut ita ipse est sua summa
140
 misericordia 
quae superexaltat judicium: ergo exigendo tam gravem emendam, 
videtur venire contra suam misericordiam. [f. 135b] 
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 [3.] Item, impius judex est qui plus exigit in emenda, quam 
possit reus facere: quia ille non quaerit emendationem rei, sed 
sitit sanguinem ejus, cum omnis justitia non quaerat nisi 
emendare hominem et salvare: ergo si Deus exigit talem emendam 
quam non posset praestare purus homo vel homo infirmus
141
 in 
statu in quem ceciderat, videtur quod non decenter sic exigat, 
sed impie, sitiendo mortem hominis: ergo cum hoc non sit fas 
credere de Deo, videtur quod homo purus per se satisfacere 
potuit: et sic alius modus fuit Deo possibilis. 
 [4.] Si tu dicas, quod homo non fuit in gratia, et ideo 
nihil gratum Deo
142
 facere potuit.  Contra hoc est, quod cum homo 
facit quod potest, statim dat ei Deus gratiam: sed multi sunt 
qui fecerunt quod potuerunt, et gratiam habuerunt, et sic 
possibile fuit de omnibus si se praeparassent: ergo videtur, 
quod Deus id quod potuerit facere, acceptare debuit.   
 [5.] Item, dicit Johannes, quod mandata ejus gravia non 
sunt.
143
  Hieronymus etiam dicit, quod “anathema est quod dicit 
Deum praecepisse impossibilia.”144  Ergo numquam exigit ab homine 
talem emendationis modum, quem non posset explere nisi Deus et
145
 
homo, ut videtur.   
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 Solutio: Sine praejudicio dico, quod alius modus fuit 
possibilis, considerata potestate Dei cui nihil injustum est et 
nihil impossibile, ut dicit Anselmus: et tamen ex parte nostra 
impossibile fuit nos redimi nisi per Deum et hominem: non quod 
hoc intendam dicere, quod si Deus nos aliter
146
 liberasset quin 
essemus liberati: sed est considerare potentiam liberationis ex 
parte Dei, et ex parte nostra, et ex parte utriusque simul, 
scilicet Dei et hominis.  Ex parte Dei quidem fuit alius modus 
possibilis: ex parte autem hominis videtur alius modus mihi 
impossibilis.  Si autem ex parte utriusque consideratur, id est 
nostra potestas relaxata
147
 ad omnipotentiam, in qua fit quidquid 
vult, fuit quidem alius modus Deo
148
 possibilis, sed nullus ita 
conveniens.  Si enim quaeratur, utrum de trunco possit fieri 
vitulus, dico quod non.  Si autem quaeratur, utrum Deus de 
trunco possit facere vitulum, dicimus quod sic.  
 His habitis, planum est respondere objectis. 
 [1.] Ad primum dicimus, quod dimittere culpam impunitam 
dicitur dupliciter, scilicet impunitam, hoc est, sine omni 
poena: et hoc est impossibile coram judicio Dei: quia, sicut 
dicit Anselmus, hoc esset coram Deo impius sicut justus, et 
placeret ei peccatum sicut virtus, quod est impossibile.  Vel 
dimittere peccatum sine condigna poena: et hoc est judicis 
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quaerentis emendam rei, et hoc modo fuisset, si Deus homini sine 
morte Filii peccatum indulsisset: puniverat enim hominem in hac 
vita, et purgatorio amplius punire potuit: et ideo nihil 
indecens ex parte sua sequeretur ad hoc. 
 [2.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod congruum [f. 135c] et 
incongruum ex parte nostra sumuntur, et non ex parte judicii 
Dei, cui congruum est omne quod facit: quia etiam illud quod 
videtur incongruum ex contrario usu, si Deus faceret, 
congruissimum esset: unde si parceret a poena condigna, 
clementiae deputaretur, dummodo justitia pro tanto salvaretur, 
quod non remaneret peccatum inultum poena emendante, non 
suffocante reum. 
 [3.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod bene concedo, quod si 
possibilitas ex parte nostra attendatur, ut facit Anselmus, quod 
non erit justitia nisi restituens ablatum, et satisfaciens 
offensae: et hoc non potuit esse nisi per Deum et hominem, ut 
dicunt Anselmus et Ambrosius.   
 [4.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod omnes illae auctoritates 
loquuntur de possibilitate congruentiae, et non de potestate Dei 
in se. 
 [5.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod praedestinatio non imponit 
necessitatem, sed immutabilitatem facit: et ideo nihil prohibuit 




 [6.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod fides erat de eo quod non erit 
aliter quam creditur, sed tamen possibile est esse aliter: fides 
autem et praedestinatio bene tollunt actum mutabilitatis
149
 in 
contrarium, vel in aliud quam sit hoc de quo sunt, sed non 
tollunt potentiam mutabilitatis: et ideo illa argumenta non 
cogunt.   
 Oportet autem solvere ea quae sunt ad oppositum: quia 
secundum meam opinionem ex parte nostra attendendo potentiam 
satisfaciendi, non fuit possibilis alius modus. 
 Dico ergo ad primum, quod omnes illae auctoritates 




 [1.] Ad id autem quod objicitur,
151
 dicendum quod Filium Dei 
ex bonitate decuit omnem
152
 signum dilectionis homini exhibere, 
quod pertinebat ad salutem, nisi hoc cederet in injuriam 
justitiae vel deitatis: sed non in injuriam deitatis fuit 
passio:
153
 quia deitas nec passsa, nec compassa est: sed in 
humana natura passus est Dei Filius: et hanc non
154
 decuit 
exsilium et mortalitas. 
 [2.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod alio modo injuriam dimittere 
potuit Deus, sed ex parte hominis remansisset verecundia, sed 
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quod homo abstulisset quod non reddidisset.  Et si quaeras, 
utrum Deus hanc verecundiam auferre potuisset, dico sine prae- 
judicio, quod opprobrium quidem auferre potuit: sed veritatem 
mutare non potuisset: quia contra se fecisset.  De praeterito 
enim verum fuit, quod homo rapuit quae per se solvere non 
potuit: et ideo congruissimum fuit judici clementissimo, ut tale 
faceret judicium, ut destrueretur peccatum, et homo tantum dando 
vel plus quam rapuit, ab opprobrio simul et post
155
 liberaretur.  
 [3.]  Ad aliud dicendum, quod plus exigere quam homo 
possit, dicitur duobus modis, [f. 135d] scilicet simpliciter, et 
sic sonat extorsionem, vel de expensis judicis, ut reus 
pristinam recipiat dignitatem: et sic exigere plus quam purus 
homo possit, sonat misericordiam et bonitatem judicis erga nos: 
et hoc est quod dicit Psalmus: redemptionem misit Dominus populo 
suo.
156
  Quod enim ultra vires nostras exegit, ad gloriae nostrae 
cumulum fuit: quia aliter conscientia testis veritatis semper 
diceret nos rapuisse, et non solvisse Dei honorem. 
 [4.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod homo in quantacumque gratia 
Dei
157
 sit, dummodo sit purus homo, non potest satisfacere pro 
peccato quod in omnem mundum redundavit: et hoc sufficienter in 
praemissisi probatum est: nec tamen secundum dicta Sanctorum 
credo, quod umquam alicui post primum peccatum gratia salutis 
                                                     
155
 Paris: “peccato.”  
156
 Ps. 110:9. 
157
 Paris om. “Dei.”  
Nichols 65 
 
data sit, nisi in dilectione et fide unigeniti, qui omnes 
reconciliavit.  Non dico, quod non dare
158
 potuerit quantum est 
de potentia Dei.  Et sic patet, quod nihil est quod objicit.  
 [5.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod mandata non sunt gravia 
habenti caritatem: et hoc ideo quia Filius Dei nobis ea 
levigavit
159
 sustinendo pro nobis quod nos sustinere debebamus: 
quia Dominus iniquitates nostrum omnium in eo posuit,
160
 et nunc 
iam facile est nobis.  Unde potest dici, ut prius, quod a nobis 
ad injuriam nostram non exegit impossibile nobis, sed ad 
gloriam, ut ipse daret Unigenitum per quem factum est possibile, 
quod ante erat
161
 impossibile, licet non Deo cui nihil est 
difficile. 
 Et per hoc patet solutio ad totum. 
[Articulus II] 
[Mg] De alio modo redemptionis qui dicitur fuisse possibilis. 
 Secundo quaeritur, quae sit illa possibilitas de qua 
dicitur, quod alius modus fuit Deo possibilis?   
 Videtur autem, quod nulla: quia 
 [1.] Potentia Dei non potest esse nisi secundum 
congruentiam decentissimam: ergo Deus nihil potest, quod 
congruenter non potest. 
                                                     
158
 Paris: “dari.” 
159
 Paris: “alleviavit.” 
160
 Isa. 52:6. Paris: “Dominus posuit in eo iniquitatem omnium nostrum.” 
161
 Paris add. “nobis.” 
Nichols 66 
 
 [2.] Item, potentia Dei non refertur ad opus nisi secundum 
ordinem sapientiae praeordinantis, quia aliter ageret 
praecipitanter Deus: sed sapientia Dei praeordinaverat istum 
modum: ergo non fuit possibilis apud Deum alius modus, ut 
videtur. 
 [3.] Item, detur quod potentia Dei sit respectu alterius 
modi cum igitur fuit respectu
162
 istius, ut patuit in effectu, 
ipse
163
 mutaretur de opere in opus: cum hoc igitur sit aliqua 
mutatio, et Deus sit immutabilis penitus, videtur quod si 
potentia Dei fuit de isto modo, quod non potuit esse de alio.   
 Sed contra: 
 Deus non agit per necessitatem naturae, sicut facit virtus 
et potentia naturalis, sed agit per voluntatis libertatem: 
quidquid autem facit libertas voluntatis potest facere et non 
facere, et alio modo facere: ergo videtur, quod Deus potuit hoc 
modo liberare et non liberare et alio modo liberare, quia aliter 
ipse esset minus liber in agendo quam nos; quod absurdum est.  
 Solutio: Dicendum quod, una est et simplex potentia Dei: 
sed tamen potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet ut exsequens 
sapientiae praevisionem et ordinationem, et sic videtur, quod 
non fuit alius [f. 136a] modus possibilis nostrae liberationis, 
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 a sapientia ordinante: sed tamen potuit alius 
esse praevisus, et tunc potentia operans alium exsequeretur.  
Aliter consideratur secundum quod antecedenter se habet ad 
sapientiam: potest enim Deus facere per sapientiam omnia 
ordinantem, non ordinavit se facturum: et de hac potentia 
loquendo, alius modus fuit Deo
165
 possibilis: et de hac potestate 
loquuntur Sancti plerumque.  
 [1.] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quidquid Deus faceret, 
eo ipso esset decentissimum quoad operantem, quod ipse faceret, 
ut prius dictum est.  Et si objicias, quod dicit Aristoteles, 
quod potest Deus prava agere: dicendum, quod accepit 
materialiter, id est, potest agere id quod est pravum, quod 
tamen non esset pravum, sed optimum eo ipso quod Deus ageret 
illud.  
 [2.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit de 
potentia exsequente ordinem praevidentis sapientiae: et de hac 
non loquimur, cum dicimus quod alius modus liberationis fuit 
possibilis Deo. 
 [3.]  Ad aliud dicendum, quod potentia Dei immutabilis est: 
quia si daretur quod fuit de alio modo, sequeretur quod numquam 
fuit de isto: licet enim utraque istarum possibilis sit divisim, 
potentia Dei est de isto modo, et potentia Dei est de alio modo: 
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tamen non sunt compossibiles secundum relationem ad potentiam 
operantem: quia aliter Deus mutaret opus suum, quod esse non 
potest.  
[Articulus III] 
 [Mg] Utrum alius modus redimendi genus humanum Deo fuisse 
possibilis. 
 Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, “Sed nostrae miseriae 
sanandae modum non fuisse.”  Potest enim esse dubium, quamvis 
alius modus possibilis fuit liberationis nostrae, quod tamen 
alius modus quo redimeremur non fuit possibilis.  Hoc enim 
probatur sic: 
 [1.] Redimere est rem suam justo pretio vel bello 
recuperare: sed justum pretium esse non potuit nisi aequivalens 
offensae et damno: sed, sicut probatum est super, damnum est 
tota natura humana perdita, et quidquid fluxit in ipsa in 
pejorem statum, et hoc est omne quod est inferioris naturae quam 
homo, sicut dicit Glossa, ad Roman. viii: Omnis creatura 
ingemiscit et parturit usque adhuc.
166
  Offensa autem fuit 
infinita, quia contra Deum.  Ergo justum pretium oportuit esse 
infinitum bonum, non autem potuit esse infinitum bonum
167
 nisi 
Deus et homo, qui deberet ut homo, posset ut Deus: ergo 
redemptio non potuit esse nisi per Deum et hominem.   
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 [2.] Item, si de redemptione belli jure loquimur: tunc 
sicut patet in littera, justum est et
168
 idem vincat qui vinctus 
est, et in eodem, scilicet in ligno.  Unde Ambrosius in hymno de 
passione “Ipse lignum tunc notavit, damna ligna ut solveret.”169 
Hoc ergo iterum non poterat fieri juste, nisi per Deum et 
hominem: et ita alius modus non fuit possibilis nostrae 
redemptionis. 
 [3.] Item, detur quod redimamur ab alio quam a Deo, sive 
sit homo de novo exinde damnata
170
 natura factus, sive angelus 
incarnatus: [f. 136b] illi ergo tenemur tamquam redemptori: ergo 
erimus inferiores illo semper: homo autem creatus est, et in 
tanta dignitate, ut nulli nisi soli Deo subesset: ergo per 
redemptionem illius pristinae dignitati non erit restitutus: 
ergo redemptio non est perfecta per illum. 
 [4.] Item, Deus praevidit futurum hominem in dignitate 
aequali angelorum: si autem
171
 redemisset, non esset in aequali 
dignitate: ergo Deus frustaretur praeordinatione sua: quae quia 




 Sed contra: 
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 [1.] Ab injuste possidente non oportet redimere pignus, sed 
vindicare in potestatem: sed diabolus injuste possedebat nos, ut 
infra dicetur in hac eadem distinctione: ergo ab illo non 
oportuit tali pretio hominem redimere. 
 [2.] Item, impium est dicere, quod pretium saeculi, sci- 
licet Christi sanguis, et anima, ablata
173
 sint diabolo ad 
redemptionem hominis: cum igitur non tenuerit nos nisi diabolus, 
videtur quod non sumus redempti a diabolo, nec hoc modo, nec 
alio.  
 Solutio: Sine praejudicio loquendo, concedo primas 
rationes, scilicet quia non fuit alius modus possibilis nostrae 
redemptioni, nisi per pretii talis solutionem, nisi redemptio 
large pro liberatione accipiatur: quia non est nisi duplex 
redemptio, scilicet jure belli, et sic redempti sumus a 
servitute? diaboli per victoriam Christi: et solutione pretii, 
et sic non sumus redempti a diabolo: quia absit quod Christus 
sit diabolo oblatus pro nobis, sed Patri: et nos soluti sumus a 
decreto Patris obligante nos ad non intrandum in paradisum, nisi 
tanta appareret in uno justitia humilitatis quod omnibus 
sufficeret, ut supra distinctione xviii dictum est.   
 Et per hoc patet solutio ad ultimum. 
 Ad praecedens dicendum, quod licet diabolus nos injuste 
possideret, nec pretium solutum sit diabolo, tamen juste nos 
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possidebamur, tenente nos in obligatione sua justa sententia 
justitiae judicis, cui etiam pretium solvebatur in nostra 
redemptione. 
[Articulus IV] 
[Mg] Utrum Filius Dei fuisset incarnatus si homo non peccasset. 
 Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit “Qui enim mentes nostras 
tantum erigit, ad amorem.” 
 [1.]  Secundum hoc si homo non peccasset, videtur quod non 
tantum amorem suum provocasset.  Unde in quadam sequentia 
cantatur: “O culpa nimium beata, qua redempta est natura.  Deus 
qui creavit omnia nascitur ex foemina.”174  Quasi diceret: Hoc 
ipso quod culpa peracta est, Deus homo est factus.  Igitur si 
homo non peccasset, Deus non esset incarnatus. 
 [2.] Item, in quibusdam ecclesiis in benedictione cerei 
cantatur: “O felix culpa, quae tantum ac talem meruit habere 
redemptorem.”175  Ergo vidtur, quod si culpa non esset, Filus Dei 
non esset incarnatus. 
 [3.] Item, Apostolus ad Rom. xiii Quoniam diligentibus Deum 
omnia cooperantur in bonum, his qui secundum propositum vocati 
sunt sancti,
176
 dicit Glossa, “Etiam peccata.” Ergo peccatum 
unitatis
177
 in aliquod bonum debuit cooperari universitati: hoc 
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autem peccatum [f. 136c] originale est quod omnes trahunt ab 
Adam: ergo aliquod bonum oportebat
178
 elici ex illo: hoc autem 
non de facili invenitur nisi incarnatione Christi: ergo videtur, 
quod Christus non fuisset incarnatus, si peccatum non fuisset. 
 [4.]  Item, ad quid fuisset incarnatus si peccatum non 
fuisset?
179
  Non enim tunc indigeremus doctore, vel liberatore, 
vel redemptore: ergo videtur quod superflua fuisset incarnatio 
eius,
180
 ergo videtur quod si peccatum non fuisset, non 
excitasset ad caritatem, sicut fecit peracto peccato.  
 Sed contra: 
 [1.]  Bonum est diffusivum sui et esse: ergo optimi erunt 
optimo modo quo potest se defendere: non autem potest se melius 
nobis infundere
181
 quam incarnando: ergo videtur, quod incarnatus 
esset etiam si peccatum non esset. 
 [2.] Item, Anselmus dicit quod quatuor generationes sunt de 
perfectione naturae, sine quibus generatio est imperfecta, 
scilicet de terra virgine vir virgo, de viro virgine femina 
virgo, de viro et muliere corruptis infans virgo.  Restat ergo 
unus modus, scilicet de femina virgine virum virginem producere, 
vel ordo generationis non fuisset perfectus: ergo cum Dei 
perfecta sint opera, ipse complevisset hunc ordinem, etiamsi 
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homo non peccasset: si de virgine non potest nasci nisi Filius 
Dei, ut dicit Cassianus:
182
 ergo Filius Dei esset incarnatus, 
etiamsi non peccasset homo.   
 Item Deus ab aeterno praeviderat filium incarnandum: ergo 




 [3.]  Item, supra per verba Sanctorum probatum est angelum 
non esse unibilem, sed hominem: cum igitur nulla aptitudo 
frustra sit creata a Deo, necesse fuit hanc aptitudinem impleri: 
ergo necesse fuit Deum incarnari. 
 [4.] Item, peccatum non fecit similiorem et unibiliorem 
nostram naturam cum Deo, quam esset ante peccatum: ergo cum 
similior sit Deo ante
184
 peccatum, quam post peccatum, videtur 
etiam unibilior.
185
   
 [5.] Item, perfectio universi consistit in dimensione 
circulari, ut probat Philosophus: et quia circulo nihil 
adhibetur, ideo mundus maxima perfectione naturae est perfectus: 
ergo similiter cum Dei opera sint perfecta, ultimum debet 
concludi an
186
 primum ut circulus fiat: primum autem Deus et homo 
debent uniri: et hoc contingeret, etiamsi homo non peccasset. 
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 [6.] Item, Amor maximus se communicat maximo modo: non 
autem potest magis, quam ut se uniat: ergo cum talis amor sit 
Dei
187
 ad hominem, ipse unit se ei: ut videtur etiam si non 
peccaret. 
 Solutio: Dicendum quod in hac quaestione solutio 
conjuncta
188
 est.  Sed quantum possum opinari, credo quod Filius 
Dei factus fuisset homo, etiamsi numquam fuisset:
189
 nec tamen 
fuisset factus angelus, quia angelus non est unibilis naturae 
sicut homo, ut supra [f. 136d] ostendimus: tamen nihil de hoc 
asserendo dico: sed credo quod hoc quod dixi, magis concordare 
pietati fidei.   
 [1.] Dico igitur ad primum, quod tales locutiones valde 
impropriae sunt, ut dicatur culpa beata et felix: quia non 
dicitur beata
190
 in se, sed ex consequenti.  Et licet forte 
Christi incarnatio non sit sequens ad culpam, tamen magnalia 
opera redemptionis per laborem et passionem et mortem secuta 
sunt ad culpam. 
 [2.] Per hoc etiam patet solutio ad secundum. 
 [3.] Ad alium dicendum, quod peccatum non cooperatur bonum 
nisi per accidens, sed quia ferventior et magis gratus aliquis 
quandoque resurgit, quando cecidit, et magis efficitur humilis 
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et cautus: si autem et Christi incarnatio secuta est, nescio: 
sed hoc certum est, quod redemptio per mortem est secuta.  
 [4.] Ad aliud dicendum quod incarnatus fuisset ad 
ostensionem eximii amoris sui, et ut multiplices delicias 
praepararet homini, cum contemplaretur eum in carnem similem vel 
fratrem, quem universitas habet dominum.  
 [1.] Si autem velimus contrarium sustinere, quod tamen mihi 
non videtur: dicemus ad primum contra objectum, quod bonum
191
 
diffundit se secundum ordinem naturae, secundum
192
 capacitatem 
eorum qui capiunt illud: non autem cadit in capacitatem aliquam 
naturae vel meriti unio deitatis ad carnem: et ideo non oportet 
quod se illo modo diffunderet.  
 [2.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod non
193
 completa esset sine 
ultimo modo in esse naturae, licet non in optimo esse gratiae: 
nec oportet hoc quod Deus faciat in optimo esse quod potest 
ipsum facere si vellet: sed sufficit illo modo quo vult dummodo 
nihil deficiat ei de esse naturae vel
194
 de naturalibus. 
 [3.] Ad aliud dicendum quod aptitudo non est ex natura, sed 
ex gratia electionis, ut saepe supra habitum est: quia homo ille 
ut in unitatem Filii Dei assumeretur, non meritis vel natura, 
sed gratia habuit. 
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 [4.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod licet peccatum fecerit 
necessarium deformem tantum,
195
 fecit necessarium redemptorem: et 
haec necessitas cogit misericordem Deum incarnari.  
 [5.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod talis ratio circuli non est 
necessaria ad perfectionem, sed potius circulus ordinis, ut 
ordinentur ad Deum tamquam ad finem, quae exiverunt ab ipso 
tamquam a principio.  
 [6.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod sufficiebat ostensio amoris in 
glorificatione: quia non oportuit Deum omni modo amoris 
ostendere, sicut nec modo facit.  
 Ad hoc autem quod objicitur de praedestinatione habet 
solutionem specialem, scilicet quod praedestinatio ponit ordinem 
sapientiae: et illa praevidit culpam futuram, et non
196
 prae-
ordinavit redemptorem.  Sed tantum primum mihi probabilius 
videtur.  
[Articulus V] 
 [Mg] Utrum homo iuste a potentia diaboli sit liberatus. 
 Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, ibi “Sic justitia 
superatur diabolus” [f 137a]  Potest enim hic esse dubium, quae 
sit illa justitia
197
 redemptorum, aut redimentis.   
 [1.] Si primo modo est: cum illi justitiam fecerunt etiam 
ante incarnationem Christi, videtur quod debuissent fuisse 
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redempti: sicut dicit de Abraham, Rom v,
198
 quod signaculum 
justitiae fidei circumcisionem accepit,
199
 et sic de aliis.  Si 
autem esset justitia redemptoris, ut videtur dici in littera: 
tunc videtur, quod non fiat justitia: quia non est justum ut 
liberetur per justitiam alterius, qui justitiam non fecerit. 
 [Mg] Utrum si Deus homo alio modo liberasset, modus ille 
iustus fuisset. 
 [2.] Ulterius quaeritur si alius modus esset vel fuisset, 
utrum fuisset injustus? Et videtur quod non: quia Deus nihil 
potest facere injustum. 
 Sed Contra: 
 [1.] Potentiae modus hic dividitur contra justitiae modum: 
igitur si usus fuisset Christus potentiae modo, non fuisset 
justus modus.  
 [2.] Item, ponamus Deus et nostram carnem accepisset, et 
tamen nos potestate eripuisset: tunc videtur modus convenientior 
fuisse: quia tunc videtur teneremur ad gratiarum actionem de 
suscepta natura, et tamen et ipse et nos sine
200
 labore veniremus 
ad regnum: igitur ille fuisset modus magis conveniens, et magis 
nos obligans Deo.  
 [3.] Item, in judicio hominis fraus nulli patrocinatur: 
ergo non debet acquirere jus aliquod in judicio Dei.  Constat 
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autem, quod diabolus fraudulenter decepit hominem: ergo nullum 
jus fuit ei acquisitum in homine: ergo videutr magis fuisse 
injustus modus, quod hominem quasi adjudicatum dimisit ei, et 
per justitiam laborare
201
 voluit, quam si condemnando hominem
202
 
daemonem propter fraudem, hominem in potestatem suam 
retraxisset.  
 Solutio: Dicendum quod nullus modus esset injustus
203
 ex 
parte Dei: sed ex parte hominis justitia redditio
204
 pro meritis: 
et ideo poena satisfactoria pro culpa debet infligi.  Unde dico 
quod primum intelligitur de justitia redemptoris, quam solvit 
pro redemptis.  
 [1.] Ad illud quod contra objicitur, dicendum quod justitia 
redemptoris exigebatur ad hoc ut
205
 esset obex apud eos: quia 
gratia capitis non profluit sua membra nisi sit dispositio in 
membris, quasi receptibilia stringere:
206
 et ita utraque 
exigitur: via ut praeparans subjectum, altera ut liberans. 
 [2.] Ad aliud dicendum quod omnis modus fuisset Deo justus, 
sed non adeo conveniens ex parte hominis redempti. 
 [1.] Ad aliud dicendum quod poenae modus non dividitur 
contra justitiae modum, ut oppositus ei, sed ut non adeo 
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conveniens, non ex parte Dei, sed ex parte nostra, ut prius 
expositum est.   
 [3.] Ad aliud dicendum quod fraus daemonis non fuit sine 
culpa hominis decepti: et ideo licet daemonibus patrocinari non 
debuit, tamen homini debuit nocere: et ideo ex parte illa debuit 




 [Mg] Utrum solum a peccato originali simus redempti. 
 Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit “in potestate diaboli 
ita datum est genus humanum,” etc.  Ex hoc enim videtur quod 
solum originale sit causa [f. 137b] quare indigemus redemptore: 
et ita videtur, quod quilibet per se potuit satisfacere de 
actuali.   
 [Mg] Utrum de actuali peccato quilibet sine redemptore 
satisfacere potuisset. 
 Sed hoc non videtur, quia: 
 [1.] Majus peccatum est commisum per seipsum, quam 
contractum ab alio: ergo pro Christo
208
 major debetur 
satisfactio.  Si ergo pro alieno
209
 peccato oportuit intervenire 
justitiam redemptoris, multo magis debuit hoc fieri pro peccato 
proprio. 
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 gravius peccatum est, quod graviori poena punitur in 
delinquente: sed actuale punitur et carentia visionis Dei et 
igne gehennae; originale autem tantum carentia visionis Dei: 
ergo si originale exigit redemptorem, multo magis actuale.  
 [2.] Item, hoc videtur ex auctoritate Sanctorum supra 
posita, quod dicunt quod nulli numquam peccatum remissum est, 
neque adulto neque parvulo, sine mediatoris fide.  Constat 
autem, quod mediatoris fides conjungit justitiam Christi cum 
justificatis: ergo sine justitia Christi nulli remittitur 
peccatum.  
 [3.] Item, si verum est quod dicunt Sancti et omnes 
doctores communiter, quod passio Christi operetur in omnibus 
sacramentis: tamen oportet dicere quod etiam operatur in 
poenitentia: cum igitur sine sacramento poenitentiae nulli 
umquam remissum sit peccatum: sine justitia mediatoris in 
passione umquam nulli remissum est peccatum. 
 [4.] Item, Isa. liii: Nos omnes quasi oves eramus
211
... et 
Dominus posuit in eo iniquitatem omnium nostrum. Ergo posuit in 
eo etiam iniquitatem actualem. 
 [5.] Item, Glossa, ad Roman. vi, dicit quod peccata 
praecedentium fuerunt in sustentatione Dei, donec
212
 ad 
ostensionem justitiae redimentis per Christum. 
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 [6.] Item, in praecedenti distinctione expresse scribitur 
sic: “In poenitentia poena minoratur per Christum: non enim 
sufficeret illa poena qua poenitentes ligat Ecclesia, nisi 
Christi poena
213
 cooperaretur, qui pro nobis solvit.”  Constat 
autem quod Ecclesia nullum temporali poena obligat pro 
originali.  Ergo in
214
 actuali non possemus satisfacere, nisi 
esset ibi justitia.   
 [7.] Item, ratio Anselmi est quod indiguimus redemptore: 
quia offendere Deum facit offensam infinitam, sicut ipse est 
infinitum bonum: cum ergo in actuali morali offendatur Deus, 
videtur eadem ratione exigere redemptorem.   
 Sed contra hoc quidam objiciunt sic:  
 [1.] Alius modus fuit possibilis: ergo non necessario 
exigitur justitia redimentis.  
 [2.] Item, antiqui patres fidem, spem et caritatem 
habuissent, etiamsi Christus non fuisset incarnatus: cum ergo 
cum talibus virtutibus non possit stare actuale peccatum, merito 
fidei, et aliarum virtutum fuisset deletum, etiam praeter 
justitiam redemptoris.  
 [3.] Item, potentia gratiae ad vincendum peccatum major est 
quam peccati potentia: ergo si peccatum sine alterius adjutorio 
valet inficere animam, potentia gratiae virtutum sine alterius 
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adjutorio valebit expellere peccatum: ergo sine gratia et [f. 
137c] justitia redimentis. 
 Solutio: Dicendum quod consentiendum est rationibus primis: 
quia hoc dicunt Sancti innitentes illi verbo Io. i: dicimus 
plenitudinem omnes accepimus gratiam pro gratia.
215
  Et illi qui 
praeibant et qui sequebantur omnes pariter clamabant: Hosanna in 
excelsis!
216
 non pro originale tantum, sed pro omnibus 
actualibus. 
 [1.] Ad primum autem quod objicitur in contrarium, dicendum 
quod alius modus fuit possibilis: sed tamen impossibilis fuit 
omnis ille modus qui non conferret gratiam adjuvantem contra 
peccatum ex justitia aliena: sive illa fuisset Dei justitia, 
sive fuisset alicujus alterius satisfacientis. 
 [2.] Ad aliud dicendum quod fides antiquorum et spes et 
alia bona efficaciam traxissent tunc ab illo alio modo quicumque 
fuisset: sed quia alius non fuit, ideo trahebant efficaciam ab 
isto.  Sicut si sol non esset causa diei, esset aliud luminare 
quod faceret diem: numquam tamen esset possibile, quod mundus 
illuminaretur seipsa, quod haberet sufficiens lumen ex quibusdam 
partibus suis, micantibus ut gemmae sunt, vel quaedam partes 
ignis: et hoc modo justitia meritorum Christi fulget in 
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virtutibus Sanctorum, sicut sol in gemmis, quae magis rutilant 
in praesentia solum, in absentia autem obtenebrantur.   
 [3.] Ad aliud dicendum quod gratia potentior est: sed non 
habet potentiam illam, quae destruat id quod aliquo modo 
infinitum est vel conjuncta illi quod aliqua ratione est 
infinitum, ut merito Christi, quod est meritum Dei et hominis: 
et quod peccatum dicitur posse inficere sine adjutorio, hoc non 
est posse, sed potius deficere.  Deficere enim quodlibet potest 
per se corruptione principiorum conservantium, sed non ex se ita 
proficere.  
[Articulus VII] 
 [Mg] Utrum aliquis cuius natura non fuisset depravata 
praeter Christum satisfacere potuisset.   
 Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, ibi: “Eramus natura 
filii irae: natura scilicet, ut est depravata,” etc.   
 Ex hoc enim videtur, quod si natura alicujus non fuisset 
depravata, quod illud potuisset satisfacere pro nobis: et hoc 
saepe supra improbatum est: quia hoc autem esset pura creatura 
aut Deus purus et creatura.  Si creatura pura aut spiritualis 
aut corporalis aut conjuncta ex spirituali et corporali.
217
  Si 
corporalis: ergo esset vilior homine: et si homo redimeretur, 
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per consequens subiceretur viliori se: ergo per redemptionem non 
recuperaret dignitatem quam amiserat.  
 Item, secundum hoc praescientia Dei, quae praeordinaverat 
hominem coaequandum angelis fore, frustraretur.   
 Item, secundum hoc justo pretio non essemus redempti, sed 
viliori quam fuit ablatum: quia totum genus humanum fuit 
ablatum, et offerretur illud corpus unum quod est impossibile.
218
 
 Item, infinita offensa Dei non esset recompensata: ergo in 
opere redemptionis non servaretur justitia.  
 Si autem fuisset creatura spiritualis vel angelus: Contra: 
 Maximum operum quoad difficultatem se est offerre in 
pretium per mortem: angelus autem est immortalis: ergo redimere 
non posset.  
 Praeterea, nullus angelus est adeo [f. 137d] altus cui non 
possit praeferri unus purus homo et aequari plures: quia beata 
Virgo praelata est omnibus, et alii assumi possunt secundum 
sortes angelorum: ergo angelus cum tota gratia non valet unum 
hominem, et aequivalent alteri: ergo ut melius nullus angelus 
pro omnibus hominibus posset offerri. 
 Item, cum sit finitae bonitatis, ipse infinitam offensam 
non posset recompensare, nec honorem debitum pro peccato Deo 
exhibere.   
 Aliae etiam rationes sunt ad hoc quod supra posuimus. 
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 Si autem dicas quod est creatura composita ex homine 
corporali et angelo, prorsus sequuntur eadem inconvenientia.  
 Si vero dicas quod potuit esse purus Deus: Contra: 
 Deus
219
 non potest: quia mereri est apud alium, et est 
inferioris:
220
 ergo Deus merendo non potest satisfacere. 
 Item, Deus nulli debet, nec pro se, nec pro alio: ergo 
debitum pro alio non restituit.  
 Item, Deus non est medius inter Deum et hominem: ergo ut 
mediator non est reconcilians et satisfaciens.   
 Item, Deus in causa hominis judex est: ergo non potest esse 
reus, vel loco rei exhibere satisfactionem. 
 Ex his concluditur, quod necesse fuit quod sit Deus et 
creatura: aut ergo homo, aut alia quam homo.  Si homo, habeo 
propositum.  Si alius quam homo: ergo satisfaciet qui non debet 
satisfacere: sed hoc est injustum: ergo non potest fieri coram 
summo Deo justo: ergo necesse est, quod sit Deus et homo.  
 Item, mediatorem necesse est habere naturam utriusque 
extremorum, licet mediet tantum in altera, ut habitum est in 
praecedenti distinctione: satisfaciens autem pro nobis mediator 
est: ergo necesse est quod habeat naturam utriusque, Dei 
scilicet et hominis: et hoc est quod intendimus.  
 Sed Contra: 
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 [1.] Originale peccatum est per alterum constructum:
221
 ergo 
per alterum potest satisfactio fieri.  Non autem est per alterum 
contractum: ergo perquisivit
222
 Deus: ergo per alium non Deum 
potuit satisifieri, ut videtur.   
 [3.] Praetera, quae justitia est illa ut pro peccato cui 
numquam communicamus in operando nec in volendo tanta exigitur 
satisfactio quam non possit exsolvere nisi Deus et homo? 
 [2.] Item, videtur quod Deus debuit creare Adam alium, qui 
omnes justitiam satisfactionis
223
 transfunderet, sicut ille 
injustitiam transfundit: quia aliter non videtur posse omnibus 
prodesse justitia, sicut omnibus nocuit culpa.   
 [4.] Item, ubi est probatum originale peccatum esse in 
homine, ut talem oporteat habere redemptorem?   
 Solutio: Dicendum quod primis rationibus standum est, quod 
non remittitur peccatum nisi Deo et homine satisfaciente pro 
nobis, licet alius modus fuisset possibilis.   
 [1.] Ad id ergo quod contra objicitur, dicendum quod 
originale per alterum contrahitur quod principium est omnium: et 
ideo per alterum non solvitur, nisi et ille principium sit 
omnium: sed non potest eodem modo esse, quia monstruosa natura 
est quae unius rationis duo [f. 138a] habet principia, sed 
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Christus est principium efficiens secundum divinitatem et
224
 
influens per modum meriti: sed ab alio non posset fieri, quia 
ille non haberet virtutem influendi membris, tamen nullo modo 
esset caput corporis mystici, ut alibi dictum est.   
 [2.] Ad aliud dicendum quod si fecisset alium Adam, essent 
duo principia secundum unum modum generationis naturalis:
225
 et 
tamen ille non influeret gratiam: quia gratia a nullo influi 
potest nisi ab eo qui est Deus et virtutis infinitae, et 
secundum quod homo habet gratiam ad mensuram, quod non 
conveniret alicui qui purus homo esset. 
 Si autem objicias quod secundum hoc Adam si non peccasset, 
non influxisset gratiam innocentiae ceteris posteris, quod est 
contra Anselum qui dicit, quod sicut transfudit originale 
peccatum, ita si stetisset, transfudisset originalem justitiam.  
Ad hoc dico quod hoc fuisset non ex Adam, sed ex hoc quod 
conjunctio humanae naturae ad Deum nulla
226
 fuisset interrupta 
peccato: et ideo a Deo semper fuisset influentia utriusque 
vitae, scilicet naturalis, et gratiae, in animam et ab anima in 
corpus.  Sed postquam facta est interruptio, non potuit fieri 
influentia gratiae hoc modo; sed oportuit quod esset per meritum 
satisfactionis: et illud meritum non influeret omnibus per
227
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rationem membri tantum, et non inf omnem capitis vel principii 
haberet.  
 [3.]   Ad aliud dicendum quod voluntate actuali et opere 
proprio non communicavimus,
228
 sed ex hoc quod nati sumus ex 
Christo et materia corrupta corrumpit animam secundum 
infectionem culpae, ut probatur in secundo libro de originalis 
peccati transfusione. 
 [4.]  Ad aliud dicendum quod signa expressa probant nos 
esse in peccato: haec autem signa sunt poenae non decentes 
dignitatem humanae naturae, ut retarditas
229
 et infantia, 
debilitas, pugna carnis contra spiritum, concupiscentia et 
ignorantia et error hujusmodi, quibus nulla ratio dicit Deum 




 [Mg] Cum homo propter peccatum transgressionis sit invasus 
a diabolo, quare diabolus non fuit invasus ab alio cum plus 
peccaverit. 
 Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, ibi: “potestatem 
peccati auctor illico invasit,” etc. 
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 Videtur enim quod ambo debebant invadi a tertio: sicut enim 
meruit invadi homo per offensum,
231
 ita diabolus per fraudem et 
mendacium, et multo magis.  
 Ad hoc dicendum quod ambos invasit sententia judicis 
condemnantis: sed tamen debebat eo jure homo in potestatem 
diaboli transire: quia se illi sponte tradidit, permittens se 
decipi ubi de facili temptationem cavere potuit: et hoc est quod 
intendit.  
[Articulus IX] 
 [Mg] Quare Deus homo potius per humilitatem quam per 
potentiam voluerit liberare. 
 Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit ibi: “Ideo autem 
potentia vincere noluit,” etc. 
 Hic enim innuit magister, quod talis liberationis modus non 
fuit necessarius, sed utilis homini quod est
232
 contra dicta 
Anselmi, et etiam contra ea quae superius probavimus.
233
 
 Ad hoc dicendum quod sicut dicit Tullius in libro [f. 138b] 
de Amicitia,
234
 licet vero amicitia fundetur supra virtutem
235
 et 
non supra utilitatem, habet tamen multas utilitates adjunctas.  
Ita dico hic ratio quidem necessitatis liberatoris non fundatur 
supra utilitatem, vel hoc vel alio modo habet tamen multas 
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utilitates adjunctas, quarum Magister partem tangit hic ex verbo 
Augustini, et quasdam alias non tangit.  Impossibile  est autem 
omnes tangere praecipue cum sint utilitates adjunctae contra 
quatuor:  
[Mg] Notatur quatuor causae quare Christus nos per modum 
humilitatis et non potentiae voluerit liberare. 
scilicet, ut amorem habeamus justitiae, non potestatis; ut 
exemplum humilitatis suae accipiamus; ut doctrinam fidei et 
prudentiae praedicationum ejus observantia;
236
 ut miraculis 
plusquam demonstrationibus in fide roboremur.   
 Utilitates autem passionis infra in sequenti parte Magister 
exsequitur.   
[Divisio Textus] 
 “Christus ergo sacerdos et hostia,” etc.  Hic incipit pars 
illa quae est de opere passionis, in quo consistit principale 
meritum. 
 Et habet duas partes: in quarum prima determinat Magister 
oblationem et traditionem Christi, qualiter facta est ab ipso a 
Patre, a Juda, a Judaeis, a Gentibus.  In secunda autem tangit 
utrum bona fuit vel non, ibi: “Passio autem Christi et opus 
Judaeorum,” etc.  
[Articulus X] 
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[Mg]Utrum solum praedestinatis valeat efficaciter passio 
Christi. 
 Incidit autem dubium primo de hoc quod dicit: 
“Praedestinatis tantum salutem effecit,” etc. 
 [1.] Praedestinati enim habuissent salutem, etiamsi ipse 




 [2.] Item, videtur falsum quia multi sunt qui accipiunt
238
 
praesentem justitiam ad remissionem peccatorum: et hoc non 
possunt facere sine virtute sacramentorum, in quibus operatur 
virtus passionis Christi: ergo et non praedestinatis valet 
efficienter passio sua, ut videtur.   
 Solutio: Dicendum quod non nisi praedestinatis valet 
efficienter passio sed omnibus tamen sufficienter: ita quod 
efficienter dicat ademptionem gratiae et gloriae, propter quae 
fuit passio
239
: non enim fuit tantum propter  gratiam, sed etiam 
propter gloriam: et ideo non totum effectum suum efficit in 
quibus valet ad gratiam in praesenti tantum: et per hoc patet 
solutio ad secundum. 
 [1.] Ad primum autem dicendum quod praedestinatum erat hoc 
non ut alio modo quam per passionem Christi liberarentur: et 
ideo necessaria fuit passio.  Vel potest dici, quod etiam his 
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quae fiunt in tempore, ut orationibus fidelium, praedestinatio 
juvatur, non ex parte Dei praedestinantis, sed ex parte effectus 




 Utrum Patri conveniebat tradere Filium vel Christo 
tradere se ipsum. 
 Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit ibi: “De quo etiam 
legitur, quod sit traditus a Patre.” 
 [1.] Si enim tradere est in mortem dare, tunc videtur quod 
tradere sonat in actionem occisionis Christi: et ita Patri et 
Christo non convenit.  Si autem tradere est pretium per mortem 
Patri solvere, [f. 138c] tunc videtur quod soli Christo, et non 
Patri convenit: et ita videtur falsum quod hic dicit.  
 [2.] Item, Apostolus.
241
  Ergo Pater tradidit Filium in 
mortem: quod videtur sonare crudelitatem Patris in Filium.  
Redit ergo quaestio adhuc, ut dicatur, secundum quem modum 
differentem traditio illa convenit omnibus illis qui in littera 
Christum tradere dicuntur.  
 Ad quod dicendum quod tradere est dare in mortem prout hic 
accipitur.  Est autem dare dupliciter, scilicet utrum unus
242
 
datur: et ut datur exhibitio ad aliquud quod non est munus, quia 
non est dantis, sed datur alio modo.  Primo modo tradidit Pater 
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Filium in mortem, ut donum quo homo reconcilaretur, et Christus 
tradidit se in mortem.  Sed Deus Pater tradidit Filium homini in 
pretium quod pro se offerat.  Filius autem tradidit se Patri per 
mortem satisfaciendo.  Traductio autem quae est exhibitio ad 
interficiendum, competit Judae ut proditori, Judaeo ut 
instigatori et creatori, Gentibus autem ut exsecutori ministerio 
iniquitatis. 
 [1.] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Pater tradidit Filium in 
passionem, sed non in actionem interficientium, quia hoc faciunt 
actus animae, quia separantur ea quae secundum naturam non sunt 
separabilia.  Unde cum tradere sit velle mori Filium, voluit 
Pater Filii passionem: et numquam voluit actionem: sed permisit 
volentibus iniquis: et hoc non est crudelitas, sed misericordia, 
eo quod mors nec auferre Filium sibi, nec ingloriosum coram eo 
Filium facere poterat, et alios poterat etiam ablatos 
restituere. Et per hoc patet solutio at totum.  
[Articulus XII] 
 [Mg] De diversa qualitate operationum Dei et Judeorum in 
passione Christi. 
 Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, ibi: “Respiciens enim 
ad passionem, unum opus, id est, passionem illorum dicitur.” 
 Videtur esse impossibile, quia 
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 [1.] In natura non potest una materia simul habere diversas 
formas et contrarias: ergo in motionibus non potest unum opus 
informari diversis et contrariis circumstantiis. 
 [2.] Item, secundum hoc unum et idem opus esset optimum et 
pessimum: opus autem Patris et Christi non potest esse nisi 
optimum, opus autem Judae et Judaeorum non potuit esse nisi 
pessimum in hoc facto. 
 Solutio: Distinguendum est, quod est opus operans quod est 
operatio ipsa, scilicet prout est ab agente, et in ipso ut 
accidens
243
 in subjecto: et est opus operatum, scilicet res 
constituta et effecta per operationem et actionem: et quod dicit 
Magister, intelligitur de opere operato, et non de opere 
operante, quia illud pessimum fuit.  Circa idem autem operatum 
possunt esse et concurrere diversae voluntates et operationes 
bonae et malae: hoc enim non est inconveniens, quia 
circumstantiae non referuntur ad opus operatum, sed ad opus 
operans: et ideo non ponuntur contrariae [f. 138d] formae in 
eodem.  Et per hoc patet solutio ad totum.  
[Articulus XIII] 
[Mg] Utrum passio Christi sit simpliciter dicenda bona vel mala. 
 Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit circa finem: “Quaeritur 
autem concedendum sit eos operatos esse?” 
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 Videtur enim, quod passio sit simpliciter dicenda bona: 
quia omne opus virtutis est bonum: mors autem Christi fuit opus 
fortitudinis et caritatis Christi: ergo simpliciter passio illa 
fuit dicenda bona vel esse quoddam bonum. 
 Item, quid dicetur simpliciter bonum, si passio Christi 
[simpliciter]
244
 bona et secundum quid non bona diceretur, a qua 
omne bonum nostrum emanavit?  Ergo videtur quod non 
distinguendum sit, ut dicit Magister. 
 Sed Contra: 
 [1.] Passio est illata ab alio: esse autem laudabile est a 
nobis, non ab alio: ergo passio non est ex se laudabilis, ut 
videtur.  
 [2.] Item, opus Judaeorum est passio, et opus Gentilium et 
Judae: ergo est pessima. 
 [3.] Item, Boetius in Topicis “Cujus generatio est bona, 
ejus corruptio est mala.” Sed Christi generatio et245 vita optima 
erat: ergo ejus mors erat pessima: ergo dicenda est mala 
absolute et sine distinctione. 
 Solutio: Dicendum quod mors Christi absolute et sine 
distinctione optima dicenda est quatuor rationibus.   
[Mg] Notatur quatuor rationes commendantes passionem Christi. 
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 Quarum una est, quia praecipuae virtutis erat summum, ut 
fortitudinis, quae secundum Philosophum praecipua virtus est: et 
maxime in Christo et illius virtutis summum quod attingere 
potest, est mors: sicut etiam ipse dicit: Majorem hanc 




 Alia ratio est quia si pretiosa est in conspectu Domini 
mors Sanctorum ejus,
247
 pretiosissima mors est Christi et pretio 
plena, sicut dicit Psalmus: Non dabis sanctum tuum videre 
corruptionem.  Notas mihi fecistis vias vitae: adimplebis 
laetitia cum vultu tuo: delectationes in dextera tua, id est, in 
aequalitate tua secundum deitatem, et in potioribus bonis 
secundum humanitatem, usque in finem.
248
 
 Tertia causa est utilitas totius redemptionis in genere 
humano, sicut dicit Osee, xiii: O mors ero mors, mors tua, 
morsus tuus ero inferne super caput!
249
 
 Quarta causa est honestas causae moriendi: posuerunt enim 
causam eius scriptam super caput eius: Jesus Nazarenus, rex 
Judaeorum, id est, haec est mihi causa moriendi, quod sum 
salvator florens gratia et virtute redemptionis, rex 
confitentium et glorificantium Deum.   
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 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Magister non jube distinguere 
in illa utrum mors Christi fuerit bona vel mala: sed in hac, 
utrum operati sint Judaei aliquid boni vel mali.  Et in hoc 
distinguendum est secundum praedictum modum de opere operante, 
et sic nihil sunt boni operati: et de opere
250
 operato, et sic 
aliquid praeter intentionem operati sunt boni. [f. 139a] 
 [1.] Ad id quod objicitur contra, dicendum quod passio in 
eo quod ab aliquo non est opus virtutis, sed in eo quod suscepta 
cum voluntate sustinendi gratia boni: et sic sustinere est a 
nobis, et non ab interficiente.  
 [2.] Ad aliud patet solutio per antedicta de opere operante 
et operato. 
 [3.] Ad aliud dicendum quod Boetius non intelligit quod 
mors in se sit mala, sed quod privat bonum quod acquiritur in 
generatione ad esse et vitam: et sic refertur ad intentionem 
Judaeorum qui Christo vitam auferre et exstinguere cupiebant: in 
se tamen bona est quae tantorum bonorum causa fuit.  
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